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Abstract
There is a significant difference between the words ‘is’ and ‘exists’ that has either
been overlooked or under-appreciated by many philosophers. This difference comes in
sentences that express existential quantification using ‘is’, ‘exists’, or their cognates, such
as, “There are cookies in the jar,” or, “There exists a strange species of fish that nobody
has studied yet.” Phrases such as ‘there are’ and ‘there exists’ are existential quanti-
fier expressions, since they’re used to express existential quantification. The orthodox
view of these expressions is that they are, in the words of David K. Lewis, “entirely
synonymous and interchangeable”. This dissertation presents and argues for an anti-
orthodox view of meaning of ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’. The root of the difference in
meaning between the two expressions is that ‘there is’ turns out to be context-sensitive,
on the model of demonstratives like ‘this’ or ‘that’, while ‘there exists’ is invariant in
its meaning. These views are motivated through the introduction of a notion called
‘ontological robustness’, which helps us evaluate the level of ontological commitment
in our assertions. The anti-orthodox view is defended over orthodoxy through holistic
arguments that compare the virtues of each theory, including such metrics as how they
fare in accounting for our stubborn desire to talk about and quantify over nonexistent
objects.
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Chapter 1
Ontological Robustness
1.1 Introduction & Overview
There is a significant difference between the words ‘is’ and ‘exists’ that has either been
overlooked or under-appreciated by many philosophers. This difference comes in sen-
tences that express existential quantification using ‘is’, ‘exists’, or their cognates, such
as, “There are cookies in the jar,” or, “There exists a strange species of fish that nobody
has studied yet.” Phrases such as ‘there are’ and ‘there exists’ are existential quantifier
expressions, since they’re used to express existential quantification. This is just what
we talk about in an Intro to Logic course, when we teach the proper usage of the ‘∃’
symbol in proofs and translations.
When we first introduce existential quantification to students, we do not distinguish
at all between the various existential quantifier expressions. We tell them that ‘∃’ is the
symbol to be used whenever we express the notion of at least one-ness, using phrases
like ‘there is’, ‘there exists’, ‘something’, etc. The important parts for the students
to learn are the inferential role and the association of the quantifier with a domain.
The inferential role is the group of inference rules associated with the symbol, and the
domain of the quantifier is a set that is provided in some formal way (e.g. stipulating
that our domain is ‘U.S. Senators’ or ‘animals on the farm’).
As we all know, though, we frequently simplify certain notions when teaching them
in an introductory course. The fact that we teach Intro to Logic students that all
the various existential quantifier expressions are interchangeable and work the same
1
2way does not automatically mean that this is a truth about the English language.1
But, as a matter of fact, the orthodox view among philosophers appears to be that the
simplification we teach in an Intro to Logic course is also the correct semantic view of
existential quantifier expressions.
David Lewis gives the orthodox view of existential quantifier expressions as explicitly
as possible here, while denying Richard Routley’s view that distinguishes between two
kinds of existential quantifiers:
Routley sees himself as defying an established orthodoxy; and I am prepared
to appoint myself spokesman for the orthodoxy he defies. [. . . ] We of the
establishment think that there is only one kind of quantification. The several
idioms of what we call ‘existential’ quantification are entirely synonymous
and interchangeable. It does not matter whether you say ‘Some things are
donkeys’ or ‘There are donkeys’ or ‘Donkeys exist’—you mean exactly the
same thing whichever way you say it.2
Routley’s view that Lewis is arguing against falls within the family of ‘Meinongian’
views, which trace back to Alexius Meinong and his distinctions between different kinds
of objects, some of which exist, some of which merely subsist, and some of which have
no being at all. And Lewis’s view that he takes on as orthodoxy traces back (at least
with respect to its orthodoxy) to W.V.O Quine’s reaction to and arguments against
the Meinongian position, beginning in his “On What There Is” [36]. For the past six
decades, we have had an orthodox view rooted in Quine, supported by philosophers such
as Lewis and Peter van Inwagen, with the primary deniers of this orthodoxy coming
from the Meinongian tradition, such as Routley, Terence Parsons, Ed Zalta, and Graham
Priest.
Although I will argue here that there is a significant difference in meaning between
‘is’ and ‘exists’ in existential quantifier expressions—and thus deny the orthodox view—
I do not support the view (commonly associated with the Meinongians) that there are
non-existent objects, or that there are different kinds of being. The orthodox view is
largely motivated by the lack of a non-Meinongian alternative; orthodoxy proponents
1 Just think of the complexity that we leave out when first discussing the logic of the material
conditional ‘⊃’, translating it as ‘if. . . then. . . ’.
2 Lewis [30], pp. 24–25
3recognize that their view does not adequately describe our use of existential quantifier
expressions, but they see the Meinongian view, which they think is incoherent or crazy,
as the only alternative to orthodoxy.
The orthodox view has it wrong on both counts: existential quantifier expressions are
not all ‘entirely synonymous and interchangeable’, and a commitment to Meinongianism
is not the only alternative to the Quine/Lewis orthodoxy. I will build a case for these
claims here, beginning by discussing what I call ‘ontological robustness’. This is a
property of existentially quantified claims that will illuminate the difference between
those that make use of ‘is’ and those that make use of ‘exists’. After I introduce and
explain this notion, I will argue that the significant difference between ‘is’ and ‘exists’ is
that existentially quantified claims using ‘exists’ are always ontologically robust, while
those using ‘is’ sometimes are and sometimes are not ontologically robust. In subsequent
chapters, I will fill out an anti-orthodox view by showing that ‘there is’ is a context-
sensitive expression, but not ‘there exists’. I’ll develop this view over the next two
chapters, argue for it in the fourth chapter, and tie up some loose ends in the fifth.
1.2 Ontological Robustness
Consider the sentence, “There are superheroes who can fly,” uttered by the same person,
but in different settings. In one setting, our speaker is discussing comic books with his
daughter. In another setting, our speaker is discussing the ontology of fiction at an APA
Conference session. There is clearly a difference between these two events, but what is
it? In the first case, the claim sounds natural as a part of a discussion about what kinds
of superheroes our speaker’s daughter can expect to find if she reads some comic books
or watches cartoons. In the second case (at the APA), the claim will be taken to have
a different kind of commitment—something involving existence.
We can characterize the difference between these two scenarios as a difference in
whether the existence of superheroes matters or not—in particular, whether it matters
to the speaker. We can say this much without even knowing whether the speaker ac-
tually believes that superheroes exist or not. The speaker could have a sophisticated
philosophical view about the matter, or he could have no view at all. If he does believe
that superheroes exist, then his claim would not be problematic in either setting (at
4least not automatically). But if he does not believe that superheroes exist, the two
situations part ways. The first claim, while talking to his daughter, could still be per-
fectly appropriate, even if he does not believe superheroes exist. But the same claim
uttered at the APA session would not be appropriate. In that situation, the existence
of superheroes matters to the discussion at hand, and he should not quantify over them
if he is not happy being committed to their existence.
1.2.1 Definition of Ontological Robustness
This feature I’ve just described is something I will call ‘ontological robustness’, since it
is exhibited by claims or assertions that are robust in their ontological commitments. I
will discuss only positive existentially quantified claims, since negative existentials (e.g.,
“Santa Claus doesn’t exist”) carry with them some quite different issues.3 So let’s define
an assertion of a positive existential claim P by a speaker S in context C, quantifying
over Fs, as ‘ontologically robust’ as follows:
S’s assertion of P is ontologically robust in C iff S would not sincerely assert
P in C if S believed that Fs did not exist.
Since the right side of the ‘iff’ here is a counter-factual, analyzing an assertion for
ontological robustness will involve looking to the closest worlds4 where S believes that
Fs do not exist and then asking whether S would sincerely assert P or not in those
worlds (in the same context as—or as close as possible to—the context in which the
claim is uttered). If some of those worlds are ones where S would still assert P in C,
then P is not ontologically robust (in C). But if all of the worlds are ones where S would
not assert P in C, then P is ontologically robust (in C).
3 See, for example, David Braun [6], Nathan Salmon [41], and many others for works on the puzzles
around negative existentials.
4 I say ‘worlds’ rather than ‘world’ because I assume the Lewisian model of closeness in which there
are an infinite amount of ‘closest’ worlds, rather than the Stalnaker model with one single closest world.
This seems like a more natural way to think of closeness, since often the change we want to imagine being
made is one that could have many different ways of affecting the world that are essentially equivalent in
closeness. I will not argue for this further, though I will freely point out that the Stalnaker view would
considerably change the interpretation of ontological robustness to a stronger claim. As it is, we need
only find one world among the closest where the speaker would continue on with her claim to show that
it is not ontologically robust. But if there is only one closest world, it matters considerably what the
speaker would do in that world, so we better be able to determine what happens there.
5More must be said about what exactly the Fs are that we should take into account
in our analysis. A brief example should illustrate this well. Suppose we are making
plans for a hiking trip, and I say:
(1) There are young pine trees growing in the north woods that I want to go see.
Which Fs should we consider to be relevant when looking at the closest worlds where
I believe that Fs don’t exist? Trees? Pine trees? Young pine trees? Young pine trees
growing in the north woods? The last option is the most appropriate, as well as the
most useful. Looking to the closest worlds where I believe that trees do not exist is
overkill for the inquiry at hand. Also notice that if we were to symbolize (1) as a classic
Aristotelian I-type sentence, we would do so as:
(2) (∃x)[(Yx & Px & Gxn) & (Wsx)]
When we teach such symbolizations in an Intro to Logic course, we tell the students
that these sentences are existentially quantified conjunctions. Inside the scope of the
existential quantifier, the left conjunct is the group of things that the speaker is talking
about, while the right conjunct is whatever the speaker is attributing to that group. It
takes some practice to be able to symbolize such sentences properly, but it is not terribly
difficult once the instruction sinks in. In sentence (1), I’m clearly talking about young
pine trees growing in the north woods, and I’m saying about those particular trees that
I want to go see them.
The set defined by the left conjunct may be called the witness set to the existentially
quantified claim.5 That is, the witnesses to sentence (1) are young pine trees growing
in the north woods, not all trees, or even all young pine trees. The group of objects
we’re talking about, or the witness set, need not be restricted explicitly. We have a
mechanism of quantifier domain restriction that may restrict this set through other
contextual mechanisms, such as shared intentions or shared knowledge in the context.6
The examples I discuss here will not rely on any particular views of quantifier domain
5 The term ‘witness set’ is defined formally in Barwise and Cooper [4], p. 191. My use of it here
will be informal, though it should fit the use for which Barwise and Cooper introduced it.
6 I am happy to follow Stanley and Szabo’s [44] explanation of how this mechanism functions. The
issue of quantifier domain restriction will return in Chapter 3, where I’ll have much more to say about
it.
6restriction—suffice it to say that we will want to be sensitive to whatever restrictions
may be in play to fix our witness set for an investigation into the ontological robustness
status of a claim.
1.2.2 Examples of ‘There is’ Claims
In this and the following few sections, I will discuss several examples that will help de-
velop the notion of ontological robustness. I’ll begin with some examples of existentially
quantified claims that make use of quantifier expressions with ‘is’ (and its cognates),
then I’ll discuss some with ‘exists’, and finally, I’ll give some examples of arguments
that employ both expressions. I will do some amount of analysis of these examples as I
go, discussing why they would or would not be examples of ontologically robust claims
(applying my definition from above), and then I will summarize and comment on the
examples in more detail afterwards.
Superheroes
Consider first a conversation about superheroes, similar to that which motivated the
discussion above. Suppose Nick is talking with his young daughter Mirah. Nick has
begun the process of introducing Mirah to comic books and superheroes, but Mirah’s
knowledge is still pretty limited. She’s also at an age where she is still learning the
differences between make-believe and reality. Mirah’s favorite superhero is Spider-Man,
and she’s familiar with some other big ones. Mirah is thinking about how Spider-Man
is part human, part spider, and she asks Nick, “Daddy, are there any superheroes who
are made of other animals than spiders?” Nick thinks for a minute and says, “Well, let’s
see, some are basically just people with animal names, like Batman and Ant-Man. But
there are superheroes who are animals but also people. Remember the Teenage Mutant
Ninja Turtles?” Now suppose Mirah gets excited and says, “When I get older I want to
be part turtle too, just like Leonardo!”
Nick could let this go, but if he wants to help his daughter get more comfortable
with the divide between make-believe and reality, he might say, “Well, the Teenage
Mutant Ninja Turtles don’t exist—they’re just made up for the comic books. People
can’t actually be part turtle.” And then, if he’s a good father, he’ll also say plenty
7of encouraging things about how Mirah could still be just as strong and talented as
Leonardo when she grows up.
For the sake of clarifying what I take to be the root of a philosophical puzzle, let’s
highlight a couple claims that Nick makes. He asserted both of the following:
(3) There are superheroes who are animals but also people.7
(4) The Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles don’t exist—they’re just made up for the comic
books.
Notice that Nick easily quantifies over superheroes using ‘there are’ in (3), where the
Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles are obviously intended to be among the things he’s
quantifying over. But then he points out soon after, in (4), that they do not exist.
Clearly, we could not freely interchange the existential quantifier expressions that Nick
uses—since Nick doesn’t believe that superheroes exist, he would not have said (3) with
‘exist’ instead of ‘are’.
Now let’s apply the definition of ontological robustness to Nick’s claim of (3). First,
if we plug in the variables, we get:
Nick’s assertion of (3) is ontologically robust when talking to Mirah about
superheroes8 iff Nick would not sincerely assert (3) when talking to Mirah
about superheroes if Nick believed that superheroes did not exist.
The story itself shows that Nick would sincerely assert (3) if he believed that superheroes
did not exist. To determine this, we look to the closest worlds where Nick believes that
superheroes don’t exist and ask whether he would assert (3) in those worlds. But the
example given shows the actual world to be just such a world, as evidenced by his
assertion of (4). In the world of this example—which seems entirely realistic—Nick is
willing to sincerely assert (3) even though he believes that superheroes do not exist.
So the right-hand side of our ontological robustness definition is false, which means the
left-hand side is as well. And this means that Nick’s claim is not ontologically robust.
7 From here on out, I will give in a footnote what I take to be the logical form of each existentially
quantified claim that I number in these examples, clarifying what I take to be the structure—and thus
also the witness set—of the claim. This sentence would end up as (∃x)[Sx & (Ax & Px)].
8 I simplified the context a little, but the phrase ‘when talking to Mirah about superheroes’ is meant
to summarize that particular kind of discussion that they were having above.
8One important point that we may draw from the case of Nick and Mirah, which
shows that our potential class of examples of non-ontologically robust ‘there is’ claims
is quite large, is that we already use ‘there is’ as a device for quantifying over things
that we believe do not exist. That is, for many things, especially objects like fictional
and mythical characters, the actual world is the closest world where we believe that the
objects do not exist, and yet we still sincerely quantify over those objects using ‘there
is’. (We do not, however, use the expression ‘there exists’ in the same scenarios. More
on this shortly.) These are the limiting cases of non-ontologically robust claims, since
the actual world is the closest world-of-interest for us.
Fictional Detectives
Another example that is similar to the superhero one, with a small but significant
difference, is the following. Suppose Nora and Glenn are discussing detective novels.
Glenn is new to the genre, and Nora is a long-time lover of these books. Glenn has
just read a bunch of Sherlock Holmes stories, and he’s quite enamored. Nora tells
him that those are a good start, but that there are tons of other kinds of detectives
than just Holmes. He asks her, “Are there any other detectives who are as good as
Holmes, though?” Nora responds, “Yes, there are other detectives who are as good as
Holmes—Hercule Poirot is actually a better detective, in my opinion.”
Nora’s existentially quantified claim, the first part of her assertion, is the following:
(5) There are other detectives who are as good as Holmes.9
To determine if this assertion is ontologically robust, we need to examine the closest
worlds in which the witnesses to this quantified claim don’t exist and ask whether Nora
would assert (5) in those worlds. This is a bit trickier than the superhero example, in
which the witness set for (3) was clearly superheroes. Here we do not want to simply
take the witnesses to be all detectives. This would point us to the closest worlds in which
detectives don’t exist at all, which would be orthogonal to our interests. Looking at
those worlds would be overkill in determining what to say about Nora’s claim, throwing
the baby out with the bathwater.
9 Initially, we would translate this as (∃x)[(Dx & x6=h) & Gxh]. See below for a modification that
will, I hope, seem reasonable.
9Instead, we have plenty of cues to determine the witness set intended by Nora,
which is narrower and more useful than the set of all detectives. In this context, Nora
and Glenn are discussing detective novels, so they’re clearly talking about fiction. Nora
would take Glenn’s question to be about fictional detectives, and she would be intending
her response to match. So the witnesses here would just be fictional detectives, with
the real claim under consideration being:
(6) There are other fictional detectives who are as good as Holmes.10
The worlds we should consider here are just the closest worlds in which Nora believes
that fictional detectives do not exist. Would Nora still assert (5) in these worlds?
The closest worlds where Nora believes that fictional detectives do not exist would
very likely be the actual world, or maybe some other worlds extremely similar to our
own. That depends a bit on Nora and what she thinks about fictional detectives. Many
people, if asked, may hold the belief that fictional characters exist. (Not Nick in our
previous example, though.) That belief may be mistaken,11 but it’s still one that people
hold. So if Nora is one of those people, we’ll have to find the closest worlds in which she
has the opposite belief. It likely would not be very hard to change her mind, though,12
so these worlds are not very far away. In such worlds, Nora would (justifiably) see the
philosophical issue of the existence of fictional detectives as irrelevant to her discussion
with Glenn. In these worlds, Nora and Glenn still read detective novels, and they still
care about things like whether Holmes or Poirot is the better detective.
Since Nora would still sincerely assert (5) in the closest worlds where she believes
that fictional detectives don’t exist, (5) is not ontologically robust. What this means,
roughly and intuitively, is that Nora’s claim did not have any ontological weight to it.
Or we might also say that any ontological weight that it appears to have is weight that
would dissolve on closer inspection, if such a thing mattered. The information she’s
trying to convey and the conversation she’s trying to have do not depend at all on the
existence of the witnesses to her quantifier. And in spite of that, it still seems like her
claim is sincere as well as appropriate in this conversation.
10 In this case, the translation would be (∃x)[(Dx & x 6=h & Fx) & Gxh].
11 As I think it is. See my [33] where I argue for an anti-realist view of fictional characters.
12 She could read my paper, cited in the previous footnote, for example.
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Tables
Let’s now consider an example that goes further beyond the limiting case where the
actual world is also the closest world we need to consider. Suppose that Martha is
planning a trip to visit her friend Bergit, and Martha wants to bring with some craft
projects she’s working on. She’s talking to Bergit on the phone about whether there
will be enough space for her to spread out and work on her crafts, and Bergit says:
(7) There is a table that will work just fine.13
This claim has both an ontologically robust and a non-ontologically robust reading, and
I’ll discuss both briefly. The witnesses for this claim are tables, and so we imagine the
closest worlds to the actual world in which Bergit believes that tables do not exist.
What do such worlds look like? This is now an exercise in counterfactual reasoning. I’ll
discuss two different kinds of worlds that might be appropriate, and why they give us
different results with respect to ontological robustness.
One kind of world we might consider is a world where Bergit believes that tables
don’t exist because there aren’t even any table-shaped objects. The closest such worlds
would likely be ones where Bergit believes that all the tables in the world have been
destroyed.14 Bergit believes that all kinds of other pieces of furniture exist, but tables
are just not part of the furniture of the world (quite literally). Let’s call these the
deprived worlds, since they are completely deprived of the functional usefulness that
comes with having tables.
A different kind of world could be a world that, from the perspective of functional
usefulness, is exactly like our own, but there is no such object as a table. Describing
this world requires a bit of familiarity with debates in ontology, especially in mereology.
We may see a table as being the composition of all the simples that are arranged table-
wise. Someone who is a nihilist about composition, for example, will argue that there
is no composite object that constitutes a table over-and-above the simples arranged
tablewise.15 We need not decide this particular debate, or even advance it, here. The
13 This would be symbolized simply as (∃x)(Tx & Wx).
14 There must have been some tables to begin with, since Bergit has beliefs about them in her world.
Thanks to Brent Braga for pointing this out to me.
15 This strange kind of vocabulary can be found in plenty of discussions about mereology, such as
Peter van Inwagen [46] saying, “Of course, if our proposed answer to the Special Composition Question
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fact that there is such an ontological question about tables is enough to motivate our
consideration of a world where Bergit believes that no such composite objects exist.
Let’s call these the non-composition worlds.
The closeness of worlds is notoriously difficult to determine with a great amount of
confidence or stability.16 Whether the deprived or the non-composition worlds are closer
to the actual world depends a bit on Bergit and her inclinations. If Bergit has had no
exposure to philosophy and is not inclined to be gripped by metaphysical puzzles, the
deprived worlds seem closer. But if she is a bit more open to abstract philosophical
worries, then the non-composition worlds seem closer.
In the deprived case, where Bergit is not philosophically inclined, we should say
that the assertion of (7) is ontologically robust, since if Bergit believed that all the
tables had been destroyed, for example, she wouldn’t say that there is one—this would
obviously contradict her belief that they’d all been destroyed. In the non-composition
case, however, we should say that Bergit’s assertion of (7) is not ontologically robust.
If the reason for Bergit thinking that tables do not exist is rooted just in philosophical
worries about mereological composition, we could reasonably expect her and others to
still go around talking about tables, even sincerely, since it is such a useful way to talk. It
may be a claim that she would take back if pressed about her ontological commitments,
but that does not mean she’s insincere when she says (7) to her friend Martha.
Free Tables
Now let’s consider an example of a claim that is ontologically robust. Suppose a restau-
rant host says to a new customer:
(8) There is a free table near the window.17
In this case, it is reasonable to see the witnesses to this claim as being free tables, so we
need only consider the closest worlds in which the host believes that free tables do not
exist. These worlds would be ones where the host believes the restaurant to be full, and
is right, then it is doubtless ture that, for any xs, if those xs are arranged tablewise or chairwise, then
those xs are all simples,” p.109.
16 See, for a classic example, Quine’s ‘Caesar’ counterfactuals in Quine [38], p. 222.
17 A standard symbolization of (8) would be (∃x)[(Tx & Fx) & (Nxw)]
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so he would not sincerely assert (8) to the newcomers. So (8) is clearly ontologically
robust.
Wolves in the Park
Another example of an ontologically robust claim comes with the following example.
Suppose Olga is thinking of going for a hike in Scenic State Park in northern Minnesota
and Ralph, the park ranger, says to her:
(9) There are wolves in the park, and they’re a little dangerous.18
This is clearly an existentially quantified claim, and the witness set for it is wolves in
Scenic State Park. Now consider Ralph and Olga in the same context, where Olga is
getting ready to go for a hike in Scenic State Park but, in this case, Ralph the ranger
believes that wolves do not exist in Scenic State Park. This would not be a world where
no wolves exist—a much closer group of worlds would be those where Scenic State Park
just isn’t a place where wolves go, and Ralph is aware of this. In these worlds, would
Ralph sincerely assert (9) to Olga? Certainly not. He would need to be insincere if he
were to say it.19 This is the kind of case where the existence of the witnesses really is
important to whether a speaker will sincerely utter the claim, since the existence of the
wolves is the whole point of the warning.
1.2.3 Examples of ‘There Exist’ Claims
So far we have only discussed examples that make use of existential quantifier expressions
with ‘is’ and its cognates. Let’s now take a look at some examples with ‘there exists’ and
‘exists’. The usage of these expressions outside of philosophical contexts is infrequent,
but there are certain kinds of settings where we tend to find them. In some scientific
settings, for example, we may use ‘there exists’ somewhat naturally when describing the
world.
18 We would translate this claim as (∃x)[(Wx & Ixs) & Dx].
19 We could imagine cases where he might still say (9) to her—if, say, some other dangerous animals
were around the park, but he knows that only the threat of wolves would keep Olga from hiking. But
that would be an insincere assertion of it.
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Eyeless Fish
Consider Jane, a biology teacher, telling her class:
(10) There exists an eyeless fish that lives in deep waters.20
Some science teachers do speak this way, and we understand them when they do; and
there’s nothing grammatically wrong with the claim. Is Jane’s claim ontologically ro-
bust? Yes, it certainly is. The witnesses to this claim will be eyeless fish, and the closest
worlds where Jane believes that eyeless fish don’t exist will likely be worlds where eyeless
fish either don’t exist or they just haven’t been discovered yet. Or they could be worlds
where Jane is just a bad biology teacher and has mistaken beliefs about the world. In
any of these cases, it seems clear that Jane would not sincerely assert (10).
With this example, the setting of the biology class would also make the ‘there is’
version of this example ontologically robust. Suppose Jane said instead:
(11) There are eyeless fish that live in deep waters.
We would have the same witness set here and the same context, so the closest worlds
would be the same. She wouldn’t sincerely assert (11) any sooner than she would (10)
in these worlds.
One thing to notice about these two variations of the eyeless fish example is that
if we’re explaining why either of the claims (10) and (11) are ontologically robust, we
will naturally give slightly different explanations. With the first one, we might say that
Jane wouldn’t say (10) simply because she believes they don’t exist—so obviously she
wouldn’t say that they exist. But with the second one, we’re more likely to appeal to the
fact that she’s teaching a biology class as the primary explanation, since this clarifies
that the existence of the fish actually matters to what she’s saying.
In this case, it doesn’t even matter if the closest worlds where Jane believes that fish
don’t exist is one where she is a nihilist about mereology. If this is the case, she would
not use the word ‘exist’ when talking about fish—it would be too obviously contrary
to her beliefs. In this world, however, she likely would be comfortable uttering (11) in
many settings, though probably not in the middle of a discussion about mereology.
20 We would translate (10) as (∃x)[(∼Ex & Fx) & Cx], where ‘Ex’ is ‘x has eyes’, ‘Fx’ is ‘x is a fish’,
and ‘Dx’ is ‘x lives in deep waters’.
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Small Cottage
An example from a more ordinary setting is a bit more difficult to manufacture and still
have it sound like something anyone would actually say. We do use the word ‘exist’, but
when it appears outside of the phrase ‘there exists’, it becomes a bit contentious whether
it should be read as a quantifier expression or as a predicate. In order to avoid such
contention, I’ll attempt to discuss only examples that are obviously quantified claims.
Suppose Caroline and Anthony are talking about places they would go on vacation
or to live if they won the lottery and didn’t need to worry about money anymore.
Suppose also that they enjoy using somewhat dramatic and poetic language. In this
setting, Caroline says the following:
(12) There exists a small cottage on an island off the North Shore of Lake Superior
that I would want to live in for a while.21
As with the fish case above, we should say that if Caroline believes that cottages do
not exist on islands off the North Shore (which, under a reasonable reading, are the
witnesses to the claim), then she would not sincerely assert (12). This claim is clearly
ontologically robust, since the existence of the right kinds of cottages really matters to
her claim in this context.
Also, as with the fish case, if we altered the sentence to a ‘there is’ claim and had
it uttered by Caroline in the same context, it would be reasonable to see that as being
ontologically robust as well.
1.2.4 Examples About Validity
I’ll now discuss a few examples that involve our intuitions about the validity of some
simple arguments. As David Kaplan maintains, sometimes our intuitions about the
truth of a sentence may be less stable than our intuitions about the logical consequence
relation holding between some claims.22
21 We would translate (12) as (∃x)[(Sx & Cx & Nx) & Wcx], where ‘Sx’ is ‘x is small’, ‘Cx’ is ‘x is
a cottage’, ‘Nx’ is ‘x is on an island off the North Shore of Lake Superior’, and ‘Wxy’ is ‘x would want
to live in y’.
22 In Kaplan [24], he says: “The important point is that although we may have differing, even shaky,
intuitions about truth, we—or at least, I—have more stable intuitions about logical consequence. These
have been ignored because of the nearly universal, and according to me, fallacious, assumption that the
notion of logical consequence is derivative from the more secure notion of truth,” p.11
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To see the contrast between ‘is’ and ‘exist’ in a slightly different way, consider the
following arguments:
Argument 1
P1 There exist superheroes who can fly.
C1 Superheroes exist.
Argument 2
P2 There are superheroes who can fly.
C2 Superheroes exist.
The only difference between these two arguments comes in the premises, where the first
uses ‘there exist’ and the second ‘there are’ to existentially quantify over superheroes.
Argument 1 seems trivially valid—it sounds as simple as an example of reasoning from
a conjunction to one of its conjuncts. Argument 2, on the other hand, strikes us as
invalid, since counterexamples immediately come to mind.
This may sound tricky, but I think that with Argument 2, the kind of setting we’re in
will make a difference to our intuitions about its validity, just as the context affects our
intuitions about individual claims. If we’re having a conversation in a comic book store,
or with our children, we would not be willing to allow that C2 follows from P2. If we’re
having a philosophical discussion, though, our intuitions would be a bit different. In
that setting, we wouldn’t be willing to assent to P2 unless we’re also willing to assent to
C2. In any case, it seems clear that it would be a mistake to say flat-out that Argument
2 is valid, since non-philosophical contexts are legitimate places to have discussions and
make inferences. But we don’t have any similar kind of concern with Argument 1.
The notion of ontological robustness can help clarify the difference between these
arguments, and thus also the difference between ‘is’ and ‘exists’. Ontological robustness
must (by definition) be evaluated with respect to a context of utterance, but we should
have some idea of what we would think of these arguments in various contexts. If we
just focus on the premises, we see that P1 will be ontologically robust regardless of
its context of utterance. That is, anytime someone asserts P1, it will be true that in
the closest worlds in which they believe that superheroes don’t exist, they would not
sincerely assert P1. Or, to put this another way, if someone believed that superheroes
didn’t exist and they wanted to assert P1, they would have to do so insincerely.
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On the other hand, P2 may be asserted sincerely sometimes, even when the speaker
believes that superheroes don’t exist. It may be completely beside the point of the
conversation whether superheroes exist or not—the speaker may just be discussing the
different kinds of super powers that various comic book characters have, completely
aware that she is discussing fiction. If the conversation turns to a discussion of the
ontology of fictional characters, however, then the speaker cannot still sincerely assert
P2 if she still believes that superheroes don’t exist. Their existence now matters to the
discussion.
The connection between the ontological robustness of these premises and our in-
tuitions about the validity of the arguments is that they are both linked to what we
would be willing to assent to in a variety of worlds where we have different beliefs about
the existence of superheroes. With Argument 1, since we could not sincerely assert
P1 while believing that superheroes do not exist, the conclusion C1 is a claim that we
would accept in any scenario where we would accept P1. With Argument 2, the natu-
ral contexts in which P2 comes out non-ontologically robust (such as simply discussing
super powers) will track those scenarios that shape our intuitions that this argument
is invalid, since we will vividly consider what we take to be solid counterexamples (like
Superman, Iron Man, etc.). In these cases, we wouldn’t accept that we could rationally
move from P2 to C2.
This difference in our intuitions about the validity between the two arguments,
connected to the difference in ontological robustness of the premises, leads us to the
difference between ‘is’ and ‘exists’. We find in these cases (as we would in many others)
that the context is crucial for determining whether ‘there is’ claims are ontologically
robust or not, but it is not crucial for determining whether ‘there exist’ claims are on-
tologically robust. The importance of context is seen in the examples in the previous
section with evaluating individual claims, and it is also seen in the way we evaluate the
validity of these arguments. Since ‘there is’ claims will be ontologically robust in philo-
sophical settings but not ordinary settings, we will not accept that the corresponding
existence claims follow from them, the way that the existence claim would appear to
follow from the ‘there exists’ claim.
Before moving on, I’ll consider a couple more pairs of arguments we can use to
compare our intuitions about validity and how they relate to the ontological robustness
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status of some of the claims involved. Not every pair of arguments will draw out the
difference that I think is there, but my aim is just to show that the difference between
‘is’ and ‘exists’ is substantial enough that we can find it in a variety of places.
First, here is a pair of arguments where an existentially quantified claim is supposed
to follow from a different existentially quantified claim, where all that changes is the
existential quantifier expression being used:
Argument 3
P3 There exist superheroes who can fly.
C3 There are superheroes who can fly.
Argument 4
P4 There are superheroes who can fly.
C4 There exist superheroes who can fly.
With these examples, the analysis will be quite similar to the previous pair. Argument
3 strikes us immediately as a valid argument, while our intuitions about Argument 4
will depend much more on the kind of conversation we’re having. In a non-philosophical
setting, Argument 4 will very likely strike us as invalid, for the same reasons discussed
above.
Next, consider a pair of arguments that follow the standard pattern of an ‘exis-
tential introduction’ rule. In both arguments, we begin with a premise about a few
superheroes who can fly, and the conclusion drawn from it is an existentially quantified
claim, differing only in which existential quantifier expression is used:
Argument 5
P5 Superman and Thor are superheroes who can fly.
C5 There are superheroes who can fly.
Argument 6
P6 Superman and Thor are superheroes who can fly.
C6 There exist superheroes who can fly.
As with the other pairs, the first of this pair strikes us immediately as a valid argument,
while the second one strikes us at least sometimes as invalid. We cannot exactly evalu-
ate the premises for their ontological robustness status, since that notion is defined as a
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property had (or not had) by positive existentially quantified claims. With the conclu-
sions, the analysis I’ve given of these claims is that C5 is sometimes ontologically robust,
sometimes not, depending on the context, while C6 is always ontologically robust. This
helps explain our intuitions about the validity of these arguments, since the flexibility of
C5 explains why the first argument sounds valid—we may assent to P5 because we’re
just talking about comic books, or we may actually think that superheroes exist, but
either way, we’d be happy assenting to C5 on whatever basis we have for assenting to
P5. But in the situations where we would assent to P6 while also not believing that
they exist, we would not assent to C6, which explains why we likely feel that Argument
6 is not valid.
1.2.5 What the Examples Tell Us
The examples discussed in this section should make it clear that the notion of ontological
robustness, though stipulated here, is a useful notion that tells us something interesting
and significant about existentially quantified claims. Analyzing an assertion for its
ontological robustness status in a context gives us a fruitful way to discuss our ontological
commitments in that context.
A method for uncovering our ontological commitments naturally brings to mind
Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, but applying the notion of ontological ro-
bustness to a case is considerably different. Quine’s criterion says that we are committed
to those objects that we would willingly quantify over if we were pressed to be serious
and honest about what we think exists.23But these two processes involve different kinds
of philosophical discussions. Hashing out our ontological commitments in Quine’s sense
is a metaphysical project, whereas determining the ontological robustness status of an
assertion is a project in semantics or the philosophy of language, something we engage
23 Peter van Inwagen [47] describes the process behind Quine’s criterion as follows: “The strategy is
this: one takes sentences that the other party to the conversation accepts, and by whatever dialectical
devices one can muster, one gets him to introduce more and more quantifiers and variables into those
sentences. (Or, if you will, one gets him to accept new sentences, sentences that come from the sentences
he initially endorsed by the progressive replacement of devices and constructions belonging to ordinary
English by devices and constructions belonging to the canonical language of quantification. [. . . ] If,
at a certain point in this procedure, it emerges that the existential generalization on a certain open
sentence F can be formally deduced from the sentences he accepts, one has shown that the sentences
that he accepts, and the ways of introducing quantifiers and variables into those sentences that he has
endorsed, formally commit him to there being things that satisfy F,” pp. 246–7
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in when our interest is in determining the meaning of our assertions in the contexts in
which we asserted them.
To contrast these two projects, we can look at cases where we routinely quantify over
objects that we ourselves believe not to exist. Quine’s claim is that when we’re pressed
about these claims, if we really don’t believe they exist, we’ll retract our earlier assertion
of the quantified claim. We’ll say that we must have just been talking loosely, that we
just weren’t paying close attention to the status of these objects. Quine is no revisionist,
though—he has no problem with us making assertions in our ordinary discourse that
quantify over nonexistent objects, since those claims can accomplish other tasks than
just to state the existence of certain objects. He only would have a problem with it if,
when pressed, we did not go some way towards retracting our earlier claim, while still
professing to believe that the objects don’t exist.
My project, on the other hand, only disagrees with part of Quine’s picture. Quine
seems to imply that we’re not sincere when we quantify over objects that we believe not
to exist, but I think that sometimes we are. I can accept the rest of Quine’s picture,
even the part about us retracting our earlier claims when we’re pressed to think about
what we actually believe to exist. I just think that the fact that we retract our earlier
claims while we’re talking metaphysics doesn’t show that the earlier claims were loose
or insincere. My interest is not in what we would commit ourselves to when pressed;
rather, I’m interested in the meaning of our existential quantifier expressions in a variety
of contexts (i.e., not just in the context of discussing ontology).
Pointing Towards a Contextualist View
Before going on to discuss them in more detail, I’ll first give a quick summary of the
examples given above. Section 1.2.2 includes two ‘is’ claims (about superheroes and
detectives) that clearly are not ontologically robust, one (about tables) that could go
either way, depending on some attributes of the speaker, and two ‘is’ claims (about free
tables and wolves) that are ontologically robust. The examples with ‘exist’, given in
section 1.2.3, are both clearly cases of ontologically robust claims. And finally, section
1.2.4 discusses a few examples of arguments and the effect that the quantifier expres-
sion chosen may sometimes have on our intuitions about the validity of an argument.
Included in that discussion is some analysis of how the notion of ontological robustness
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can help us explain that difference.
What is shown by these examples? One lesson we can clearly glean from them is
that claims with ‘is’ in the quantifier expression sometimes are ontologically robust,
and sometimes aren’t. Some of the examples of ‘there is’ claims are clearly ontologically
robust, and some are not. Furthermore, a single ‘there is’ claim uttered in one context
may change its ontological robustness status if uttered in a different context, such as
(7). We can shift that status just by changing features of the context, such as the
philosophical openness of the speaker, or the setting in which it’s uttered.
When we turn to the word ‘exist’, however, we get a different story. All of the
examples included above that involved claims with ‘exist’ in them (i.e., in 1.2.3 and
1.2.4) were clearly ontologically robust. And if we were to go back into the examples
of ‘is’ claims in 1.2.2 and change the quantifier expressions to ‘exist’ ones, I believe we
would find them all to be ontologically robust regardless of the context. Those claims
would then be:
(13) There exist superheroes who are animals but also people.
(14) There exist other fictional detectives who are as good as Holmes.
(15) There exists a table that will work just fine.
(16) There exists a free table near the window.
(17) There exist wolves in the park, and they’re a little dangerous
The last two of these were found to be ontologically robust even in their ‘is’ forms above.
With the other three, the ‘is’ versions had non-ontologically robust readings in addition
to potential ontologically robust readings. It’s possible that this is my own personal
semantic failing, but I can’t find a scenario that would allow any of the sentences (13)
through (17) to be non-ontologically robust. We would have to imagine a speaker who
believes that the superheroes or wolves do not exist, but then goes on to quantify over
them using the expression ‘there exist’ anyway. The problem is that the word ‘exist’ just
appears to have more power than ‘is’ when it comes to fixing the ontological robustness
status of a claim.
I will address why it is so next, but here I just want to point out that it appears
to be the case that context is crucial for determining whether ‘there is’ claims are
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ontologically robust or not, but it is not crucial for determining whether ‘there exist’
claims are ontologically robust. The former will frequently be ontologically robust in
philosophical settings, but not in ordinary settings. And the latter, the claims with
‘exist’, will routinely be ontologically robust regardless of context.
Why We Should Expect These Differences
There is a rather obvious and intuitive reason why examples with ‘exists’ should be
routinely ontologically robust. The expression ‘there exists’ and its cognates that actu-
ally make use of the word ‘exist’ are strongly and immediately linked to the notion of
existence, so we will not use these expressions to quantify over objects that we believe
do not exist. It sounds immediately contrary or contradictory to us.
We have constraints on the kinds of claims where it is appropriate to use ‘exists’ to
existentially quantify—constraints that do not apply to ‘there is’. These constraints are
such that, even in ordinary settings, it is only appropriate to use ‘exist’ when there is
actually some ontological, or quasi-ontological, issue at hand. For example, we might
naturally say, “It turns out that life exists on Mars,” since there’s actually an issue of
existence at hand. Now, this issue of existence is a scientific one, not a philosophical
one. But the focus of this claim is on the existence of some object.24
The immediate link between expressions that employ ‘exists’ and the notion of ex-
istence prevents us from using these expressions in ordinary contexts where we do not
care about the existence of the objects—especially ones where we want to make claims
that at least appear to refer to objects that we ourselves believe to be non-existent.
This happens all the time, and it turns out that we just don’t end up using the word
‘exists’ all that much in ordinary conversation. We do need some device in our language,
however, to communicate our quantified thoughts about nonexistent objects. The ex-
pression ‘there is’ works as just such a device, since it does not strike us as immediately
contrary or contradictory to quantify over known nonexistent objects with it.
24 It would be a mistake to think that there is a sharp line dividing existence questions that are to
be answered by scientists and those that are to be answered by philosophers. The different disciplines
provide us with different methods for approaching and attempting to answer existence questions. When
the objects in question are ones that can possibly be discovered by scientific means, then we use those
means to investigate, but when they are not so discoverable, we employ other means. And sometimes
the same objects will be investigated through both disciplines, usually to satisfy very different interests
(e.g., questions about the existence of tables), but not always (e.g., questions about atoms and gunk).
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This phenomenon is no accident—it makes sense that we would have a preference for
communicating with more flexible expressions that don’t always pack in the notion of
existence, when we’re so frequently using existentially quantified claims to communicate
something other than the existence of some objects. The device of ‘there is’ allows us to
make the claims we want to make without worrying about existence—or puzzles about
nonexistent objects—at all.
1.3 Looking Ahead
I aimed to establish in this chapter that there is a significant difference between ‘is’ and
‘exists’ as they appear in existential quantifier expressions. The difference is that exis-
tentially quantified claims that employ existential quantifier expressions with ‘exists’ are
always ontologically robust, while those that employ existential quantifier expressions
with ‘is’ sometimes are, and sometimes are not, ontologically robust.
The orthodox view expressed by Lewis must be inadequate, since it cannot be the
case that all existential quantifier expressions are ‘entirely synonymous and interchange-
able’, as he maintains. I have only discussed ‘is’ and ‘exists’, but as we see, these two
expressions differ significantly in their meaning. The device of ontological robustness
helps clarify the difference, giving us a method for teasing out the ontological thickness
of positive existential claims. When we analyze a variety of examples, we see that ‘there
exist’ claims are routinely ontologically robust, while ‘there is’ claims may or may not
be robust, depending on the context in which they’re uttered. It should be clear that
this difference provides us with a significant reason to reject the orthodox view.
If we reject the orthodox view, though, what is the alternative? Proponents of ortho-
doxy may maintain that the only alternative is a Meinongian view that commits us to
non-existent objects as part of our ontology, but I reject the notion that Meinongianism
is the only alternative. I will offer an account of the meaning of existential quantifier
expressions, beginning in the next chapter, that respects the difference between ‘is’ and
‘exists’ without requiring us to add non-existent objects to our ontology, or to make any
robust distinctions between different kinds of being.
The anti-orthodox view that I suggest replacing the orthodoxy with may not be
surprising at this point, given how I’ve discussed this issue. I maintain that ‘is’, as it
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appears in existential quantifier expressions, is context-sensitive, while ‘exists’ is not.
A context-sensitive view of ‘is’ explains the variance across contexts of the ontological
robustness status of ‘there is’ claims, and a view of ‘exists’ that treats it as invariant
explains the lack of change of the ontological robustness status of ‘exists’ claims in
different settings.
Two expressions cannot be synonymous if one of them is context-sensitive and the
other is not—this is a significant semantic difference. This difference with respect to
context-sensitivity also prevents these expressions from being entirely interchangeable.
So my proposed view amounts to a denial of both parts of Lewis’s description of the
orthodox view—I claim that ‘is’ and ‘exists’ are neither interchangeable nor synonymous.
Next, I’ll begin filling out this anti-orthodox view by developing my context-sensitive
view of existential quantifier expressions with ‘is’.
Chapter 2
Contextualism about ‘There Is’
“This difference in meaning is admittedly somewhat subtle, but it should be the goal of
semantic analysis to elucidate subtle differences, not ride roughshod over them.”
-Edward L. Keenan, “Quantifier Structures in English”
2.1 Introduction
The view I present here is that the existential quantifier expression ‘there is’ is a context-
sensitive expression. I’ll call this contextualism about ‘there is’. What does it mean to
say that ‘there is’ is a context-sensitive expression? Just as with demonstratives and
indexicals, it means that the content of the expression, when uttered in a context, is
sensitive to some feature of that context. If that feature of the context changes, then
so does the content.
With indexicals like ‘I’ and ‘today’, the feature of the context is found in the char-
acter of the expression. For example, the character of ‘I’ could be described as ‘the
speaker of the context’. This character is a function from the context of the utterance
to the speaker in that context. With demonstratives like ‘this’ or ‘that’, the feature of
the context to which the expression is sensitive is some kind of a demonstration in that
context, either physical or intentional. When I say ‘that glass’ and point to a glass, my
pointing (whether the physical pointing or the mental pointing, or intention, that goes
along with it) appears to be doing the work that the character of the indexical did.
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My view is that ‘there is’ has some similarity with demonstratives, picking up on
the intentions of the speaker in a context. Specifically, what changes from context to
context is the intended domain of the speaker, which is essentially the domain that
we would consider part of the interpretation that determines the truth or falsity of a
statement.
In this chapter, I’ll present my contextualist view, beginning with an overview and
moving on to some of the more gritty semantic details. Although there will be some
arguments here and there, the primary focus of this chapter will be to present the view
and develop enough of the details to be able to say how this context-sensitivity works
and where it’s located. The previous chapter presented a preliminary argument for this
view, based on the analysis of the ontological robustness status of several examples. The
argument will continue in subsequent chapters, primarily through holistic comparison
of this view against its competitors.
Before I begin the overview, I’ll give a brief caveat about the discussion that follows:
though it will appear from some of the things I say that I am assuming a Meinongian
position about objects—that in a substantive sense there are nonexistent objects—I do
not in fact hold this position. My view is about context-sensitivity, so the context of
a discussion in which the relevant expressions get used matters. And in the context in
which I’m writing, I am doing philosophy, thinking about existence, etc. And in this
context, I would not seriously assert, “There are nonexistent objects,” nor would I think
that claim is true. I think that the set of all the objects that there are is one and the
same as the set of all the objects that exist.
That said, I will be making claims that involve things that I will refer to as, for
example, ‘a domain that includes nonexistent objects’. Since I don’t think that there
are nonexistent objects, I also don’t think that there are domains that include nonex-
istent objects. I do, however, think that in many settings and conversations, speakers
(including me) assume or presuppose or help themselves to such domains. This is an
error of those speakers, at least in some sense, but I believe it is a common part of
linguistic practice. So in this section, when I speak about domains that include nonex-
istent objects, my claims should really be taken as being about purported domains that
include nonexistent objects. Anything I say here that may appear to commit me to a
Meinongian position, or any kind of ontology that includes nonexistent objects in any
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substantive way, are merely a matter of my speaking a bit loosely in order to effectively
explain what I think is happening with the meaning of existential quantifier expressions.
In the next chapter, I will discuss in more detail the sorts of errors I think speakers make
in this regard, and this will (I hope) help placate concerns that a non-Meinongian may
have about my ontological commitments I seem to have in reading what follows here in
this chapter.
2.2 Overview of Contextualism
In Chapter 1, I introduced a notion called ontological robustness, and I discussed several
examples of existentially quantified claims to illustrate this notion. My conclusion was
that existentially quantified claims that use ‘there is’ may be ontologically robust in
one context but non-ontologically robust in a different context.1 I take this as both
motivation and support for the view that ‘there is’ is a context-sensitive expression. The
specific contextualist view I present, then, must do its part to explain and illuminate
the phenomena we see surrounding the notion of ontological robustness.
My claim is that the context-sensitivity of ‘there is’ lies in the mechanism that
determines the domain with which the quantifier is associated. This mechanism involves
the intention of the speaker, so that if the speaker intends to quantify over non-existent
objects, then the quantifier will be associated with a domain that includes non-existent
objects (if there is one). If the speaker intends to speak only about objects that exist,
then the quantifier will be associated with a different domain, i.e., the domain of objects
that exist.
A standard Kaplanian account of demonstratives holds that the speaker’s intentions
play a role in fixing the content. The intentions are not part of the semantics of the
expression, i.e., they are not part of the content. But they play a contextual, meta-
semantic role in helping to fix what was said. They are not the same as a rule that
appears as part of the character of an indexical, but they do play a similar role. If a
speaker had different intentions accompanying her use of a demonstrative expression,
the content of her utterance could be different.2
1 I also believe that ‘there exist’ claims are invariably ontologically robust, and I will discuss that
further below, at the end of this chapter.
2 Kaplan [23] [22] are the classic works on this issue, though it’s in Afterthoughts specifically where
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It is helpful to separate here the metaphysical/semantical issue from a related, but
distinct, epistemological issue. The metaphysical/semantical part of this view of demon-
stratives says that intentions play a role in helping to fix the content of the utterance.
A related epistemological issue involves how we might know the speaker’s intentions,
or perhaps also how we might know that a speaker has been successful in referring to
something via particular intentions. In discussing my view, I will address both of these
kinds of issues, but it is important not to conflate them into one, since the metaphys-
ical/semantical part is actually part of my view of the meaning of ‘there is’, while the
epistemological question is a secondary issue that comes up when worrying about how
the view fits with our common knowledge and practice.
Now, revisiting the issue of ontological robustness, we noticed that the following
sentence is sometimes ontologically robust, sometimes not:
(1) There are superheroes who are animals but also people.
My claim was that when we make this claim in an ordinary setting, it seems clear that
we intend to quantify over nonexistent objects. The example I gave was of Nick talking
to his daughter Mirah, where he also said, nearly in the same breath, that superheroes
do not exist. There is no contradiction or even any cognitive dissonance in thinking and
asserting that superheroes don’t exist while also quantifying over them, so long as we
think it is coherent to intend to quantify over nonexistent objects. Nick does not need
to be a Meinongian—he doesn’t have to have any well-worked-out metaphysical views
at all. He may just not care about the kinds of worries that philosophers bring up when
we propose an ontological theory that includes nonexistent objects. This doesn’t mean
that he’s successful in attempting to quantify over nonexistent objects. My claim is just
that something about the meaning of ‘there is’ allows us to talk the way Nick talked in
a sensible, coherent way.
If we imagine Nick as a philosopher, however, engrossed in a discussion about the
ontology of fictional characters, then we see (1) in a different light. We can imagine
situations where his utterance of (1) is intended to reflect his beliefs about what exists,
where the domain of discourse in his conversation is intended to only include objects
that exist.
he discusses the use of intentions that is important to my view.
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To illustrate my contextualist view about ‘there is’, I’ll walk through what I take
to be the difference between these two scenarios in which Nick utters (1). I’ve already
mentioned that I think the key here lies in Nick’s intentions. It may be helpful, though,
to walk through, in a metaphorical way, the path from utterance to content. I’ll discuss
this path first in an informal way, and then a bit more formally with functional language.
When Nick utters (1), he does so in a context. Two contexts are described above,
and we’ll call the first one ordinary and the second one ontological. It is natural to
think of a conversation having a domain of discourse associated with it, or some set
of objects intended to be used for the purpose of interpreting the statements made in
the conversation. My claim is that this domain can be fixed, or altered, through the
intentions of a speaker. A domain of discourse can be a dynamic set, though I do not
think it is completely dynamic, constantly changing in small ways. It seems reasonable
to think that there are some privileged sets that tend to get fixed onto more than others,
such as the set of all objects that exist, and perhaps others.3
In walking through the path from utterance to content, we begin by looking at
the linguistic meaning of (1). Nick is speaking English, and the words and phrases he
utters all have meanings in English. The linguistic meaning may be the character of an
expression, or it may just be something in the neighborhood of a character—some kind
of information that a competent speaker of the language would know. So in this case,
the linguistic meaning of the utterance would include some minimal information about
what superheroes, animals, and people are. It would also include minimal information
about the meaning and usage of the other words: ‘who’, ‘are’, ‘but also’, and, of course,
‘there are’. The kind of information in the linguistic meaning of ‘there are’ would be
whatever a competent speaker needs to know about it to have a handle on it. So it would
include some information about the words expressing what I like to call at-least-one-
ness, that whatever it operates over must have at least one representative somewhere.
A competent speaker needn’t have any kind of sophisticated thoughts about sets, but
the notion of a non-empty group is pretty basic, so it’s reasonable to say that the
involvement of something like that notion is part of the linguistic meaning of ‘there is’.
In addition to this information, my claim is that the broadness of the group in question
3 I’ll revisit this notion in the next chapter when discussing Ted Sider and his views about ‘reference
magnetism’ and quantifier meanings.
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is flexible, and we don’t appear to want to limit it just to those objects that exist. This
flexibility is the heart of the context-sensitivity, since it allows us to talk about different
broad groups of objects in different settings.
From the linguistic meaning, we follow the path along to the semantic meaning,
or the content. There was an utterance of (1), which was an utterance in a language,
where the words have linguistic meaning, and so, through that meaning, the utterance
expresses some kind of content that, since (1) is a declarative sentence, will be the sort of
content that could be true or false, viz. a proposition. We can see the constituents of the
proposition as corresponding to the different words or expressions used in the sentence,
so that we have the word ‘superheroes’ leading to the property of being a superhero,
and the same with ‘animals’ and ‘people’. The contents of ‘who’ and ‘but also’ are
essentially just whatever is needed to evaluate the proposition in the right way (since
‘who’ is basically functioning as a variable here, and ‘but also’ is just an expression of
conjunction). When it comes to ‘there are’, the entity that shows up in the proposition
is essentially a function—one that takes properties as its input and gives other functions
as its output. I’ll give more details about the functions shortly, but to continue with a
more informal discussion, we can describe this entity as a quantifier, specifically as an
existential quantifier. As a semantic entity, a quantifier has certain kinds of features
associated with it, such as an inferential role and an attachment to a domain over which
it ranges. It is in this way (as part of this informal explanation) that the domain of
discourse finds itself attached to the semantics of the quantifier expression, or finds its
way into the content. And since, at the level of linguistic meaning, the flexibility was
in the different groups of objects we could be talking about, we will find that reflected
in the content as the domain associated with the quantifier.
Now, to compare the two contexts in which Nick utters (1), what can we say is
different? The general atmosphere is changed, since instead of talking with little Mirah,
he’s now talking with some philosophers. Most importantly, though, the goal of saying
something like (1) changes for Nick between these two contexts as well. In the ordinary
context, his goal is to educate Mirah and arrange her beliefs in a way that is best-
suited for reality. This includes both reminding her that superheroes do not exist, but
also giving her the information that certain superheroes do happen to be both animal
and people. If she’s going to know something about superheroes, she should have
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accurate information, and arranging her beliefs in that way will give her an accurate
picture of superheroes, regardless of whether they exist or not. In the ontology context,
however, the goal is more ontologically robust. In the midst of that discussion, Nick
could not coherently both maintain that superheroes do not exist and that there are
superheroes who are both animal and people. The goal of that discussion is to present
and defend views about what exists, and so the domain of discourse must be in line
with conversational goals. The explicit concern with which objects exist would override
Nick’s intentions to quantify over nonexistent objects, which he would not have in this
context anyway. So the goals and intentions of the speaker make a big difference, and
that difference relates to the domain of objects associated with the quantifier.
2.3 Two Semantic Approaches to Quantifiers
The superhero example gives us an intuitive grip on the contextualist view about ‘there
is’, but now I will widen the view a bit by discussing some semantic details of the view.
The existential quantifier is one of the central logical notions in first-order predicate
logic, and a good deal of work has been done developing the semantics of it in that
setting. But in more recent work in linguistics, the existential quantifier tends to be seen
as one determiner among many, especially due to the influence of work on generalized
quantifiers by Barwise and Cooper [4]. These different perspectives give us a couple
ways to approach quantifier semantics, and I’ll discuss both here, applying them back
to the superhero case as well.
2.3.1 Logical Treatment
I’ll begin by discussing the kind of treatment we give of the existential quantifier in
a logic course, a treatment rooted in Peirce, Frege, Russell, and others. The project
here is to translate quantified sentences into their symbolic form, revealing the logical
structure of the claims, and then evaluate them using model-theoretic truth conditions.
Let’s begin with a simple example of an existentially quantified claim and use this
to explain what needs to be explained about the logical treatment. Consider:
(2) There are black swans.
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This sentence is made up of a few different parts. First of all, we have ‘there is’, which is
the existential quantifier expression. It’s a quantifier expression because it’s expressing a
quantity. And it’s the existential quantifier expression because the quantity it expresses
is the quantity of at least one.4 Next, we have the noun phrase ‘black swans’, with
the adjective ‘black’ modifying the noun ‘swans’. The words ‘black’ and ‘swan’ both
express properties that objects may or may not have.
When we symbolize a quantified claim like this, we make use of variables to connect
the quantifier to the predicates in appropriate ways. We may unpack such a sentence,
before symbolizing it, by putting in variables to display the connections. When we do
this, we also reveal the form of a sentence such as (2) to be an existentially quantified
conjunction. That is, saying that there are black swans is really, in a sense, saying that
there is some object that is both black and a swan. So we get:
(3) There is an x such that x is black and x is a swan
The first occurrence of x here is attached to the existential quantifier, and the two
subsequent occurrences of x are attached to the two predicates into which we break up
the noun phrase ‘a black swan’. Since the same variable, x, is used throughout, the
convention tells us that there is a link between them all. This link is such that the
subsequent uses of x refer back, similarly to the phenomenon of pronoun anaphora, to
the occurrence of x linked to the quantifier. To illustrate the similarity to pronoun
usage, we could give this sentence another way:
(4) There is an objectx such that itx is black and itx is a swan.
This formulation still makes use of the variable x, but it treats it as a subscript to make
explicit the connection between the two occurrences of ‘it’ and the original ‘object’.
To continue in the direction of formalizing our sentence, we introduce a symbol for
the existential quantifier, ‘∃’. This way we may express existential quantification at the
logical form, regardless of which existential quantifier expression may be used in English
(i.e., ‘there is’, ‘some’, ‘there exists’, etc.). To generate a grammatical formal sentence,
4 In standard First Order Logic, we have just two quantifiers, the existential and the universal
(expressing the quantity of everything). Other expressions of quantity have always been recognized as
quantifiers, but in FOL they are either derived (such as ‘two’, ‘at least three’, etc.) or else absent (such
as ‘most’, ‘many’, etc.).
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a quantifier symbol must always have a variable attached to it, and that variable must
appear inside the scope of the quantifier. Following this, our sentence would next get
written as:
(5) (∃x)(x is black and x is a swan)
This is symbolic enough for our purposes. We may also go further and assign predicate
symbols to shorten our predicates, but the formulation in (5) will suit our purposes just
fine.
Next, there is the matter of the objects that we’re making use of in this discussion.
When we say ‘there is an x such that’, or ‘there is an object such that’, we need to specify
the group of objects we’re drawing from. Variables such as x may be said to have a
range, or a set of objects that are potential values for them. A rough way of explaining
this is by noticing the difference between ‘it’ and ‘she’. The potential referents of these
pronouns are not identical—any object at all could be referred to using ‘it’, but only
females (or certain other objects, such as cars and boats) may be referred to with ‘she’.
We may see the variable as really being part of the quantifier, and from this it
seems natural to say that the notion of an object is packed into the quantifier itself.
We will talk about the set of objects that the variables range over as the domain of
the quantifier. A domain is necessary in order to evaluate quantified claims, since they
really are claims about some set of objects. An existentially quantified claim, asserting
at-least-oneness of some property, is really telling us that some subset of a domain is
non-empty.
How does a domain get associated with a quantifier? That depends. If we’re doing
exercises in a logic class, learning how the quantifiers work, we just stipulate a domain
as part of an interpretation. An interpretation is an entity that gives meaning to our
language, so it includes a domain of objects plus assignments of the linguistic items to
objects, subsets, or sets of n-tuples from the domain. Names get assigned to objects
from the domain, one-place predicates to subsets of the domain, and so on.
The stipulation of an interpretation can also happen in a natural conversation,
though most often it is tacit or presupposed. A great deal of the interpretation comes
along with the language we speak. When we have a conversation in English, the mean-
ing of the names and predicates, though not necessarily precise, are defined in the way
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natural languages get their meaning—organically, over a long time, through usage, style
manuals, dictionaries, etc. There’s nothing preventing us from stipulating our own (par-
tial) interpretations in an ordinary conversation, though, even if it’s not something we
commonly do.
Now that we have the general idea of the notions relevant to quantifier meanings,
we are in a position to discuss the truth conditions of an existentially quantified claim.
Truth conditions, relative to some interpretation I, are generally given in a form that
is relevantly similar to this:
(6) I  (∃x)F(x) iff for some o in the domain, I  F[o]5
To be thorough, I’ll unpack this definition at least enough for our purposes here. First
of all, the ‘’ symbol just means that what’s on the left makes what’s on the right true.
So the notation ‘I  F’ can be read as ‘F is true in interpretation I’, or ‘I makes F true’.
The truth of a sentence is always relative to an interpretation. Next, the formulation
‘F[o]’ is an abbreviation for the result of plugging o’s name into the free variable slots in
F(x). This way of stating the truth conditions allows for the possibility that the object
that satisfies (or makes true) a sentence may not even have a name in the language of
the interpretation. In that event, it is packed into this treatment that the interpretation
would be altered with the effect of adding a name to the language and assigning that
name to the object, so we could construct the sentence needed. We will use ‘o’ meta-
linguistically, to designate the object itself, and ‘o’ as the name that the object o would
have in the language. Finally, a standard definition of an ‘interpretation’ is as follows:
An interpretation M for a language L consists of two components. On the
one hand, there is a nonempty set |M| called the domain or universe of
discourse of the interpretation, the set of things M interprets the language
to be talking about. When we say ‘for every x ’ or ‘for some x ’, what we
mean, according to interpretation M, is ‘for every x in |M|’ or ‘there exists
an x in |M|’. On the other hand, there is for each nonlogical symbol a
denotation assigned to it. For a constant c, the denotation cM is to be some
individual in the domain |M|. For an n-place nonlogical predicate R, the
5 This formulation comes from Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey [5], p. 117, with some insignificant
changes to suit my preferences.
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denotation RM is the be some n-place relation on |M| (which is officially
just a set of n-tuples of elements of |M|, a one-place relation being simply a
subset of |M|).6
Informally, we may think of the semantics of English as being an interpretation for
the English language; it may not be a well-defined or precise model, but we can see
how an English sentence will be true relative to it. Names and predicates are all as-
signed denotations, but they could have been assigned different ones under different
interpretations.
This account of truth for the existential quantifier is just what we expect—an ex-
istentially quantified claim is true in an interpretation just in case at least one object
from the interpretation’s domain has the features that the claim says are had by at least
one thing. Using our previous example, we can say:
(7) I  (∃x)(x is black and x is a swan) iff for some o in the domain, I  o is black
and o is a swan.
So our original claim (2) is true in an interpretation just in case the interpretation’s
domain has at least one object in it that is both black and a swan.
Sentence (2) is written in the English language, and we’re really just discussing
interpreting it according to the standard semantics and definitions of English. That is,
we mean the standard things that we normally mean when using words like ‘black’ and
‘swan’. We can use the symbol ‘E’ for what we might call the ‘standard interpretation’
for English, in the way that we use ‘N’ as the symbol for the standard model for
arithmetic when doing mathematical logic. That is, E has some domain of objects, and
it assigns just what we’d expect as denotations for the names, predicates, etc., of the
English language. This will not be simple or precise like N, but we can still discuss E
as a heuristic at least.
We might ask if there is one default domain of objects for English, or if that varies
in different conversations, depending on some feature, such as the context of utterance,
or the intentions of the speaker. Since interpretations are individuated by their domains
as well as their assignments, this question could be seen as a follow-up to the discussion
6 Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey [5] again, pp. 103-104.
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of E in the previous paragraph: namely, is there really a standard interpretation E for
English, or do we have different domains (and thus different interpretations) in different
settings?
As mentioned above, it is part of my view that we have different domains in different
contexts, at least in association with the expression ‘there is’. In this sense, we will
also have different interpretations in different contexts, though I’m not suggesting any
difference in assignments (other than what is forced by the changing domains). This
would not preclude English from having a standard interpretation, though. In fact, I
think that there is a standard interpretation that we make use of some of the time when
we use ‘there is’, and it is also the interpretation whose domain is associated with ‘there
exists’ invariantly.7
The Logical Approach Applied to Superheroes
Before moving on to the other approach to quantifier semantics, I would like to look
briefly back at the example about superheroes and apply to it what we’ve discussed
about the logical treatment. We begin by looking at the logical form of the sentence,
translating the sentence, “There are superheroes who are animals but also people,” into
a kind of hybrid predicate logic notation, such as:
(∃x)[x is a superhero and (x is an animal and x is a person)]
We can, using parentheses as punctuation, reflect a certain grouping, showing that ‘x is
a superhero’ is in a sense part of the subject, while the predicate includes ‘x is an animal’
and ‘x is a person’. This is how we read a standard Aristotelian I-type sentence—as an
existentially quantified conjunction, where we’re saying about the left conjunct that it
has the features described in the right conjunct. With the tools of first-order predicate
logic, though, we cannot capture the contrastive element of the ‘but also’.
My claim about context-sensitivity is essentially a claim that in different contexts,
we intend different interpretations to be used for evaluating our claims. In both cases,
the rules of the English language are the ‘interpretive’ part of the interpretation, but
7 This point falls in line with the discussion that will occur in the next chapter on ‘reference
magnetism’.
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the domain of the interpretation shifts depending on our interests. Intuitively, this
makes sense—Nick intends his utterance of (1) to be interpreted much differently by
Mirah than he would by ontologists, and he’s speaking English in both settings, so that
difference really must come in the domain of discourse he intends. Again, the intentions
of the speaker come in at a pre-formal level, but the place where they make a difference
in the formal sense is when we bring an interpretation to bear on the sentence uttered.
I’ll return to this example again after discussing the linguistic treatment of quantifier
semantics in the next section.
2.3.2 Linguistic Treatment
Next we move to a discussion of the existential quantifier as treated in linguistics, as one
determiner among many. Quantifiers are forms of determiners, but determiners do much
more than just quantify. A general way of looking at determiners is as functions that
take properties (the referents of noun phrases) as their arguments. The result is another
function that takes properties again (though now the referents of verb phrases) as its
argument and results in a truth value. Equivalently, we could just see the determiner as
a two place function, taking in two properties as arguments, resulting in a truth value.8
Seen in this general functional way, it is clear that many other expressions besides
just our usual quantifiers are determiners. Aside from the quantifiers like all, some, most,
many, two, etc., we have several kinds of categories of determiners. Demonstratives
(this, that, these, etc.) count as determiners, as do proper names. There are possessive
determiners (John’s, my, etc.), and there are anaphoric determiners (fewer, half again
as many, etc.).9 Although my discussion here will just be about existential quantifier
expressions, it is good to be aware that such expressions are seen a bit differently from
a linguistic perspective than from a logical one. In logic, whether we are aware of it
8 Cresswell [15] gives the following explanation: “Assume that an individual variable like x has the
category of name (n). Then shouts x will be a sentence (s), and nouns like author and verbs like shouts
will make a sentence out of a name—they will be in category (s/n). not will be in category (s/s) since
it makes a sentence out of a sentence, and so on. The abstraction operator turns a sentence back into a
(one-place) predicate, i.e. into a (s/n). A determiner can be thought of as in category ((s/(s/n))/(s/n)),
i.e. it takes a predicate (a noun) and turns it into a one-place operator which makes a sentence out of
a predicate (a verb),” p. 137.
9 See Keenan and Stavi [27] or Keenan [26] for examples of large listings that give a sense of the
varieties of natural language determiners.
37
or not, we tend to think of the existential and universal quantifiers as quite special,
holding a privileged position in first-order logic as our two quantifiers, each definable
in terms of each other (plus negation). But first-order logic clearly does not capture all
of our natural language—it cannot even adequately capture the logic of some relatively
easy-to-comprehend determiners like ‘most’.
So let’s now return to the example given above as (2), “There are black swans,” to
illustrate how we might break down an existentially quantified claim with the treatment
given to us in modern linguistics, rather than in logic. First of all, we might give a dia-
gram of the sentence, categorizing the parts of it, as follows:
S
NP
Det
there are
VP
NP
Adj
black
N
swans
In this sort of diagram, we have S=Sentence, NP=Noun Phrase, VP=Verb Phrase,
Det=Determiner, Adj=Adjective, and N=Noun.
We see that the structure of a sentence like (2) gets represented a bit differently in
the linguistic framework than in the logical one. The treatment of the truth conditions
for such a claim is also a bit different. Keenan [26] gives us a uniform way for describing
the truth conditions for a variety of determiners. For example, he gives these conditions,
which are intended to be general for all properties A, B :
(8) (EVERY)(A)(B) = T iff A ⊆ B
(9) (NO)(A)(B) = T iff A ∩ B = ∅
I’ll discuss this terminology in more detail shortly, but the rough idea is that, in the first
case, an Aristotelian A-type sentence such as, “Every man dies,” is true just in case the
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set of men is a subset of the set of objects that dies. And an E-type sentence like, “No
man is an island,” is true just in case the intersection of the sets of men and islands
is empty. Keenan does not explicitly give the same sort of formula for the existential
quantifier, but it is easy enough to see how that would go:
(10) (THERE ARE)(A)(B) = T iff |A – B | ≥ 1
Again, the basic idea is that an I-type sentence such as, “There are men who enjoy
pain,” is true just in case the result of subtracting the set of things that enjoy pain from
the set of men gives us a set with cardinality of 1 or more, i.e., the set of men who enjoy
pain is non-empty.
Now, to move through this formula a bit more slowly and carefully, let’s recall our
example (2) from above, “There are black swans.” Using the above formulations, there
are two ways of representing the sentence. They’re equivalent, but we may prefer one
way over the other, depending on how we view the quantifier and its potential restriction.
These two formulations are the following (where D in (12) is just the domain of objects
associated with the claim, which I’ll discuss more shortly):
(11) (THERE ARE)(BLACK)(SWANS)
(12) (THERE ARE)(D)(BLACK ∩ SWANS)
Let’s take (11) first. We can read it as follows: (THERE ARE) is a function from prop-
erties to functions, while (BLACK) and (SWANS) are both properties. (THERE
ARE) takes (BLACK) as its argument, and it gives another function, which we could
call, in this case, (THERE ARE BLACK). This is now a function from properties
to truth values, taking (SWANS) as an argument and giving the truth value True or
False, depending on whether there actually are black swans or not.
To put this in set-theoretic lingo, we can say that (BLACK) and (SWANS) are
associated with subsets of our domain D, the first just being the set of black objects
in D, and the second being the the set of swans in D. The function (THERE ARE)
grabs onto the first subset, the set of black objects, and compares it to the other subset,
the set of swans. If the intersection of these two subsets is non-empty, then the value
of (11) is True; if it is empty, then the value is False.
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Sentence (12) differs as follows. If we want to be clear that the quantifier itself is
unrestricted, we might fill the first argument with D, representing the entire domain
of objects associated with the claim. Then (THERE ARE), which is a function
from properties to functions, takes (D) as its argument, and it gives another function,
(THERE ARE ENTITIES). This is now a function from properties to truth values,
taking (BLACK ∩ SWANS) as an argument and giving the truth value True or False,
depending on whether there actually are black swans or not.
To put this in set-theoretic lingo as well, we can say that (D) and (BLACK ∩
SWANS) are associated with subsets of D, the first just being D itself, and the second
being the intersection of two subsets, one the set of black objects in D and the other the
set of swans in D. The function (THERE ARE) grabs onto the first subset, D itself,
and compares it to the other subset, the set of black swans. If the intersection of these
two subsets is non-empty, then the value of (12) is True; if it is empty, then the value
is False.
Keenan discusses the equivalence of these two kinds of formulations in the following
passage:
We have been interpreting Ss like Some swans are black directly as SOME
(SWAN)(BLACK). But in standard logic it is represented as (∃x )(Swan(x )
& Black(x )), where the quantification is over all the objects in the model,
not just the swans. In our variable free notation this would be SOME(E )
(SWAN ∩ BLACK).10 This formulation eliminates the restriction to
swans in favor of quantifying over all the objects in the universe, and it pre-
serves logical equivalence with the original by replacing the original predicate
property BLACK with an appropriate boolean compound of the noun prop-
erty and the predicate property, SWAN ∩ BLACK. Thus some does not
make essential use of the domain restriction imposed by the noun argument.
The same equivalence obtains if we replace some by e.g. exactly two. Exactly
two swans are black is logically equivalent to Exactly two objects are both
swans and are black.11
10 Keenan uses E the way I’ve been using D, as the domain of objects associated with our claim or
model.
11 Keenan [26], pp. 58-59.
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Keenan calls quantifiers that have this feature ‘sortally reducible’, when we could replace
the first argument with the entire domain D and the second argument with a boolean
function of the noun and predicate properties. Quite a few determiners turn out to be
sortally reducible, and he discusses them in Keenan [25].
Notice that this domain is the same as that which shows up in the logical treatment—
the universe of discourse, or the set of objects that underlies our conversation. So this
notion is common and crucial to both treatments. I’ll say more about domains as we
go along, continuing into the next chapter. Now it will be useful to stop and say a little
more about functions and how we might think about them in this setting.
Picturing the Functions
In the Linguistic Treatment, we talk about determiners as functions from properties to
other functions (which go from properties to truth values). It is helpful when discussing
functions to look at them two different ways: intensionally (i.e., descriptively) and
extensionally (i.e., set-theoretically). I’ll do both here. Before getting to determiners,
though, I’ll discuss a simpler example of the meaning and the operations of a function.
The successor function—let’s call it s—is one of the simplest functions there is. This
function takes any integer as an argument and gives the successor of that number, i.e.,
it adds one to that number. So the successor of 1 is 2, the successor of 45 is 46, the
successor of 1,911 is 1,912, and so on. We’ll write equations such as these as: s(1)=2,
s(45)=46, and s(1,911)=1,912.
Now, I’ve already explained everything that needs to be explained about s, but we
can see that there are a couple different ways that we go about explaining it. One is to
describe what the function does (usually in active, dynamic language, as if the function
is an agent), and another is to provide examples of particular cases. The intension of
the function, then, is the descriptive meaning of it; the sort of meaning that we would
see if we looked in a dictionary. The extension of the function, on the other hand, is a
set of objects, where each object is a particular example of the function’s input/output
matrix. So we get:
Intension of s: A function that takes an integer as argument and gives as output the
successor of the argument, i.e., the argument integer plus one.
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Extension of s: {<x,y>: y=x+1}
We read the set in the second of these as, essentially, ‘the set of ordered pairs <x,y>
such that the second item (y) is just the first item (x) plus 1.’ So this set would start
off like this:
{<1,2>, <2,3>, <3,4>, <4,5>, <5,6>, . . . }
The only real restriction in the extension of a function is what we can call ‘uniqueness-
of-output’—the restriction that we cannot have two members such that they contain the
same first item and different second items. That is, for one input, a function must always
give at most one output. If you put 4 into the successor function, you will get 5 out every
time. This uniqueness-of-output restriction holds for all functions. The converse holds
for the successor function (since each number also has a unique predecessor), but it does
not hold for all functions. Take addition, for example. Both 3+5=8 and 4+4=8. That
is, the extension of the addition function contains both <<3,5>,8> and <<4,4>,8>.
But uniqueness-of-output still holds, since the input of <3,5> will always only give you
the same output of 8.
When we move to a determiner, these functions get a bit more complicated. A
determiner like ‘there is’, as mentioned above, is a function from properties to functions.
And the functions spit out by the first kind are functions from properties to truth values.
We can view this formally in the following way. Let our function symbols be f, f*1, f*2,
f*3,. . . , and let our property symbols be p1, p2, p3,. . . . We’ll let f be our determiner
function and f*n be the function that is the result of operating f on some property pn.
We can then see these functions extensionally as follows:
f: {<p1,f*1>, <p2,f*2>, <p3,f*3>, . . . }
f*n: {<p1,T>, <p2,T>, <p3,F>, . . . }
In the second of these, the second slot of the ordered pairs would be either T or F,
depending on whether the sentence in question is actually true or false—these are just
filled in to show a complete structure. Another way we might represent the functional
structure of a sentence with a determiner and two predicates, then, is: [f(pn)](pm), or,
equivalently, f*n(pm).
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Returning to (2), we could say that a function t is the determiner expressed by
‘there is’, pb is the property of being black, and ps the property of being a swan. The
determiner made out of applying t to pb would be t*b, so we could express (2) in
functional language either as [t(pb)](ps), or, equivalently, as t*b(ps).
The Linguistic Approach Applied to Superheroes
Let’s return now to the superhero example and view it through the lens of the linguistic
treatment, focusing on the functional aspect of the words involved. The linguistic ap-
proach begins with a different take on the representation of the syntax of the sentence
from that given by the logical treatment. Rather than translating it to its first-order
representation, we might diagram the sentence to reveal its structure as follows:
S
NP
Det
there are
NP
N
superheroes
VP
RC
RP
who
VP
V
are
NP
N
animals
Conj
but also
N
people
This approach may look quite a bit different, but it does not exactly reveal to us anything
new in what’s happening with the sentence. We see that ‘superheroes’ goes under the
initial NP node, which groups it in a way that was reflected with parentheses above
in the first-order translation. The main difference we might notice is the absence of
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variables in a parse tree like this one. This structure is displaying something slightly
different to us than a translation—rather, it’s showing us the grammatical ordering and
dependencies, and we can read off of this the functional structure of the sentence. Recall
that a determiner is treated as a function from properties to functions, so the initial NP
node shows us the determiner expression (‘there are’) and an expression of its argument
(‘superheroes’). The result of applying the there are function to the property of being
a superhero is another function that takes the property (of being both an animal and a
person) expressed by the predicate as its argument. We can represent this in functional
notation as follows:
(13) (THERE ARE)(SUPERHEROES)(WHO ARE ANIMALS BUT ALSO
PEOPLE)
But recall that it is equivalent to write this same sentence in the following, slightly
different, functional notation, making the domain an explicit component as the argument
of the determiner function:
(14) (THERE ARE)(D)(SUPERHEROES ∩ WHO ARE ANIMALS BUT
ALSO PEOPLE)
It is this second formulation upon which I’d like to focus at the moment. This formu-
lation makes it clear that there must be some domain D accompanying the utterance
of the sentence, since the sentence includes a function that takes D as its argument.12
So where does this D come from? It must just be the domain of discourse in the
conversation in which the sentence is uttered. And that domain of discourse, I claim, is
supplied by the intentions of the speaker.
When we are talking about the actual functions and properties displayed in this
functional representation, we are again talking about the content of the utterance on
certain occasions. So again, my claim is that a meta-semantic feature of the context (the
speaker’s intention) plays a determinative role in fixing a crucial part of the content of
the utterance, viz. the domain that gets associated with the determiner function. Here
12 The previous formulation ultimately requires this too, since the property (SUPERHEROES)
will be seen as being associated with the set of all superheroes, which must, on a standard treatment,
be seen as a subset of some larger domain or other.
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the domain works as the initial argument of the determiner function. This is a little
different in structure to the logical treatment, where we talk about an interpretation
that gets used to give meaning and truth values to the expression. But the effect is the
same, including a domain at the level of content that is crucially associated with the
quantifier.
In fact, since (13) and (14) are equivalent,13 it is reasonable to see the domain either
as being the argument for the function or as part of the determiner function itself. In
this sense, it is not just the proposition expressed that changes from context to context,
but the quantifier itself, i.e., the content of the existential quantifier expression ‘there
is’.
In the example of Nick uttering (1) in different contexts, my claim was that he
intended different domains at the two different times/places of utterance. Let’s call the
first domain D1 and the second D2. At this point, I am not making any strong claims
about which sets these domains are; my claim is just that they are not identical. At a
minimum, D1 is intended to have nonexistent objects in it, and D2 is not. And since
the domains are fixed via the speaker’s intentions, it is reasonable to say that these two
domains would not be identical. What we must say, then, is that when Nick utters (1)
in the ordinary context, the content of his utterance could be represented in either of
the following ways:
(15) (THERE ARE)(D1)(SUPERHEROES ∩ WHO ARE ANIMALS BUT
ALSO PEOPLE)
(16) (THERE ARED1)(SUPERHEROES)(WHO ARE ANIMALS BUT ALSO
PEOPLE)
But when Nick utters (1) in the ontological context, the content of his utterance is a
bit different, represented in either of the following two ways:
(17) (THERE ARE)(D2)(SUPERHEROES ∩ WHO ARE ANIMALS BUT
ALSO PEOPLE)
(18) (THERE ARED2)(SUPERHEROES)(WHO ARE ANIMALS BUT ALSO
PEOPLE)
13 See the discussion of this above.
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In each case, we see that some constituent of the proposition differs, depending on the
context in which the sentence was uttered. Between (15) and (17), the domain, seen as
the argument for the determiner functions, while between (16) and (18), the determiner
functions themselves differ, since the domains—here seen as part of the functions—differ.
This is what it means when we express the view that ‘there is’ is context-sensitive—
the content of utterances made using ‘there is’ as an existential quantifier expression
varies depending on the context. And that variance in content is reasonably seen to
be located in the determiner function itself, giving us different functions in different
context. As mentioned above, I see the speaker’s intention, or the intended domain of
the speaker, as that feature of the context upon which the variance depends, or upon
which the content of the quantifier expression is fixed.
To express this in slightly different functional notation, we could say (as above) that
a function tn is a determiner expressed by ‘there is’, associated with domain Dn. We
will have ps, the property of being a superhero, and pap the property of being both an
animal and a person. The determiner made out of applying tn to ps would be tn*s, so
we could express (1) in functional language as tn*s(pap).
14
Now we are in a position to express the variance between contexts in this kind of
functional notation. Let tn be the determiner function expressed by ‘there is’ with
intended domain Dn. In the ordinary context, Nick’s utterance of (1) will have a func-
tional content represented as t1*s(pap). In the ontological context, Nick’s utterance of
(1) has the similar, but slightly different, functional content represented as t2*s(pap).
Again, this is just a different way of expressing the variance at the level of content that
occurs, depending on which context Nick is in when he utters (1).
This notation corresponds nicely to the treatment given above in (16) and (18). If
we like, we could also modify our notation to match the equivalent treatment of (15) and
(17). Just let pd1 and pd2 be the properties associated with being members of D1 and
D2, respectively,
15 and let psap be the property associated with the set that is the union
14 As mentioned above, there are a couple equivalent ways of expressing this in functional language.
The alternate way we might express (1) is [tn(ps)](pap). I see these options as giving us a way to
highlight the choice of looking at the domain as being part of the determiner function or as being
an argument of the determiner function. For my purposes, I don’t believe this choice really makes a
difference, but it may for other inquiries.
15 If it’s not clear by now, I’m helping myself to a non-minimalist view about properties. I think that
very little hinges on a precise view about properties here, so I will not discuss them any further than
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of the sets associated with ps and pap. Then we may represent the functional content
of Nick’s utterance of (1) in the ordinary context as t*d1(psap), and in the ontological
context as t*d2(psap).
2.4 On ‘Exists’
So far in this chapter, I have focused entirely on the expression ‘there is’. In the previous
chapter, I built a case for a difference between ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’, arguing that
the notion of ontological robustness gives us reason to see such a difference. My claim
was that the difference we find in examples that make use of the two existential quanti-
fier expressions is such that ‘there exists’ claims appear to be invariantly ontologically
robust, while a ‘there is’ claim may be ontologically robust in one setting but not in
another.
This chapter has extended my view about the difference between ‘there is’ and
‘there exists’ by filling out the details of a contextualist view of ‘there is’. I have less
to say about ‘there exists’ at this point, since the purpose of this chapter is not to
extend substantive new arguments for the view. Rather, the focus here is on explication
of the details of the view. The preliminary argument lies in Chapter 1’s claims about
ontological robustness, and there will be further argument to come, primarily in Chapter
4, when this view is compared holistically with its competitors.
At this stage, it will at least be useful to fill out my positive view by making clear
that, while I hold that ‘there is’ is a context-sensitive expression, I maintain that ‘there
exists’ is an invariant expression. That is, its meaning is fixed from context to con-
text. Aside from this difference, ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ are, of course, very similar
expressions. Since they are both existential quantifier expressions, they both denote de-
terminers. And the functional operation of the determiner picked out by ‘there exists’
will be the same as that picked out by ‘there is’, except for the behavior of the function
with respect to the speaker’s intentions.
This difference can be seen as analogous to the kind of difference we see between other
context-sensitive expressions and their invariant counterparts or neighbors. Consider
just to say that each property will be associated with the set of all objects that have that property, and
for each set of objects, it makes sense to speak of an associated property, e.g. the property of being a
member of that set.
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the difference between ‘yesterday’ and ‘Monday’. As I write this, today is Tuesday, so I
could interchange those two expressions in many of my sentences without any problems.
I could say, “I took my truck to the shop yesterday/on Monday,” or, “I had a much
better day yesterday/on Monday than I’m having today.”16 The expressions ‘yesterday’
and ‘Monday’ both denote a day of the week, but ‘Monday’ is invariant in that it always
refers to the same day of the week, while ‘yesterday’ denotes different days of the week,
depending on the day on which it’s uttered.
One way of viewing this difference is that context-sensitive expressions have a big
hole in their meaning that needs to be filled—a day-shaped hole for ‘yesterday’, a
speaker-shaped hole for ‘I’, or a domain-shaped hole for ‘there is’—while invariant ex-
pressions have no such hole. A bit less poetically, we can use the language of functions
and say that context-sensitive expressions are like functions in search of an argument,
while invariant expressions are like constant functions—there’s a nominal sense in which
they take in an argument, but since they have a constant output, the input really plays
no role in their meaning. So any time we speak, we do so in a context, and some features
of that context get used as needed arguments for context-sensitive expressions, but that
context plays at most a vacuous role in invariant expressions.
These analogies should sound plausible when we compare ‘there is’ with ‘there exists’,
since the word ‘exists’ carries with it its own connotations that are not present in ‘is’.
The expression ‘there is’ is flexible and adaptable, while ‘there exists’ is essentially a
specification of ‘there is’. That is, the word ‘exists’ fills out the meaning of ‘there
is’, making it clear—or at least clearer—what we are quantifying over. We may have
plenty of questions about which things exist (evidenced by the popularity of physics and
metaphysics), but there is a presumption when we use ‘there exists’ that there is some
domain that includes all existing objects, and that’s the domain we intend now. There
is no such presumption packed into ‘there is’, as we saw in the examples in Chapter 1.
16 For those worried about the fact that ‘Monday’ here is ambiguous, or could be referring to multiple
different past Mondays, we could fill out the example and use ‘Monday, December 3, 2012’ instead.
Chapter 3
Unrestricted Domains and
Nonexistent Objects
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I’ll take up two topics that follow close on the heels of the contextualist
view presented in the previous chapter. These topics are the following:
1. Although it may be tempting to think so, my contextualist view is not about
quantifier domain restriction, but rather about the unrestricted domains of the
quantifiers, and
2. Although it may be tempting to think so, my view does not require me to be
committed to there being nonexistent objects, since the demonstrative model of
contextualism I hold provides for a natural way to make sense of reference failure
in claims that purport to quantify over nonexistent objects
I will discuss these topics in turn, and they each should help clarify contextualist view
while also placating some potential concerns about it.
3.2 Why this isn’t about Quantifier Domain Restriction
Quantifier domain restriction, discussed recently in works such as Stanley and Szabo´ [44],
is not what I’m talking about when I give the contextualist view of ‘there is’ presented
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in the previous chapter. To say it plainly, contextualism is a view about the unrestricted
domain of the existential quantifier, and how that varies from context to context. Quan-
tifier domain restriction, on the other hand, is a view about how, once we’re in a context
and an unrestricted domain is fixed, those unrestricted domains get further restricted.
It will be tempting to conflate these two issues, so for clarification, and to pre-empt ob-
jections that my view is nothing more than a view about quantifier domain restriction
dressed up to look a bit differently, it will be helpful to address it head on.
I’ll briefly explain Stanley and Szabo´’s view about quantifier domain restriction here,
since we need to have a few details of a representative view in order to explain why it is
a different sort of issue. Their view holds, among other things, that nominal expressions
have a hidden component at the semantic level that gets fixed by context. This com-
ponent is a set that creates a restriction on the domain of quantifiers under which the
nominal expression appears. Outside of any context, this component is constructed of a
function variable and an individual variable, e.g., ‘f(i)’. Upon a use of the nominal ex-
pression, the context of its use fills in these variables with a function and an individual,
respectively.
For example, consider the claim, “Every man runs.”1 On a particular utterance of
this sentence, chances are good that the intention is not to say that every man in the
whole world runs, but rather that every man within some particular domain runs. The
Stanley/Szabo´ view represents this claim as follows:
S
NP
Det
every
N
<man, f(i)>
VP
V
runs
Here what fills the noun slot is the pair <man, f(i)>, which is the set that is the
1 Examples of quantifier domain restriction are more common, or at least clearer, with universally
quantified claims, so we’ll use this example to begin illustrating the view.
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intersection of the set of all men and the set determined by the result of filling in the
variables ‘f’ and ‘i’ in the expression ‘f(i)’.
So if the speaker intends to be talking about, say, just those men who are in the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Department of Philosophy (UMDP), then the context would replace
the function variable ‘f’ with a function—let’s call it ‘g’—from organizations to their
members. And context would also supply the UMDP as the particular organization—
let’s call it ‘p’—to replace the individual variable ‘i’. The set picked out by ‘<man,
g(p)>’ would be the intersection of the set of men with the set of members of the
UMDP. That intersection is just the set of male members of the UMDP. So the claim
would now say that everything in the set of male members of the UMDP runs. This
lines up nicely with the intentions of the speaker.
For a case with the existential quantifier, let’s revisit an example from the previous
chapter:
(1) There are black swans.
The parse tree given there looked like the following:
S
NP
Det
there are
VP
NP
Adj
black
N
swans
Modifying this tree in light of Stanley and Szabo´’s view, we would get:
51
S
NP
Det
there are
VP
NP
Adj
black
N
<swans, f(i)>
Notice that the difference comes just in the nominal slot, replacing ‘swans’ with ‘<swans,
f(i)>’. What is being added is a function that, along with features of the context, serves
to restrict the domain. But this means that in order for that variable to do any work,
there must already be a domain that will be restricted, i.e., there must already be an
unrestricted quantifier domain. The unrestricted domain is conceptually prior to any
restriction placed on it. These two activities—fixing an unrestricted domain and then
placing some kind of restriction on it—are distinct in their purpose. The unrestricted
domain includes, we might say, all the kinds of things that the speaker is helping herself
to in the conversation. The restricted domain is much more specific, and it only involves
one particular kind of thing. It may answer a question such as, “Which men are you
talking about? All men?” or, “There are black swans where? Here in the U.S.?”
Examples of quantifier domain restriction are easy to come by with the universal
quantifier. When someone says, “All the beer is in the fridge,” she is very likely intending
a restriction on which beer is in play—it would be very odd if she meant all the beer in
the universe.
With the existential quantifier, examples are a little less straightforward, but we
can still see how they work. Consider the following situation. Michael is a member of
the Perth Association of Black Swan Travelers. (Members of PABST go off and travel
the world, looking for other places that have black swans.) Michael is traveling in the
U.S., and he spots black swans in Thief River Falls, MN, so he buys a postcard with a
photo of the Thief River and big lettering that says “Thief River Falls” on it. He writes,
“There are black swans!” on the back and addresses it to PABST, sending it from the
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local post office. When PABST receives this card, they will get the message that there
are black swans in Thief River Falls, MN, even though Michael didn’t explicitly restrict
his claim.
Now, there are multiple ways to explain the semantics of Michael’s postcard claim.
Quantifier domain restriction a` la Stanley and Szabo´ is one of them, saying that the
context of the utterance (which here would include the front of the postcard and the
postmark) will provide the information needed to fill the appropriate variable in the
nominal, and the domain of the quantifier will then be restricted in some reasonable
way. So Michael wouldn’t actually be making a flat-out ontological claim about there
being at least one black swan in the universe—rather, he’ll be saying that there’s at
least one black swan in Thief River Falls, MN. Competitors to Stanley and Szabo´ may
argue that the restricted claim is just on implicature—i.e., that the restriction is done at
the level of pragmatics, not semantics. This is not important for the point I am making
in this section. I am simply trying to point out what quantifier domain restriction is in
order to distinguish it from my own contextualist view.
Notice that whether the restriction of the domain happens one way rather than
another, the dispute between Stanley/Szabo´ and their competitors in this case isn’t
about the unrestricted domain. They are concerned with how the unrestricted domain
becomes restricted, whether that’s a semantic or a pragmatic process. If we focus on the
unrestricted domain itself, we will ask different questions, such as whether the claim is
ontologically robust or not. In this case, it seems clear that, regardless of what we have
to say about the restriction of the quantifier domain, Michael’s claim is ontologically
robust. In the closest worlds where Michael does not believe that black swans exist, he
would not send a postcard back from Thief River Falls like the one described—at least
not in a way that counts as a sincere utterance of the claim.
This difference between the unrestricted domain and a restriction of that unrestricted
domain is a subtle one, and it’s especially confusing if we want to hold context-sensitive
views about both of them. (I’m not arguing for that combination, but I’m also not
quibbling with the Stanley/Szabo´ view, so the combination is a live possibility for me.)
The basic difference, though, is that the unrestricted domain includes whatever objects
we consider fair game for our entire conversation, whatever may help us communicate
all of the thoughts we’d like to communicate, or whatever kinds of objects we would
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like to help ourselves to. A restriction of that domain, on the other hand, includes just
whatever objects we would like to focus on right now, at this particular point in our
conversation, to make the point we would like to make with the appropriate amount of
precision.2
3.3 Quantifying Over Non-Existent Objects
The other issue raised in the previous chapter but postponed until now is that of domains
that include nonexistent objects. I stressed that I don’t actually believe in nonexistent
objects or, by extension, domains that include nonexistent objects. This may sound
disingenuous or tricky, so it is worth unpacking this issue in some detail here. In
his recent book Talking About Nothing, Jody Azzouni frames the kind of problem I’m
dealing with quite clearly:
One thing going on is that we have a powerful intuition that when we talk we
always talk about things. Our talk is always directed toward one or another
topic. This is not the mere grammatical impression that every sentence has a
“subject.” The intuition runs deeper than that—it’s the impression not only
that our talk is about things, but that how it is with those things determines
the truth or falsity of that talk. If this description of our intuitive impression
(of how it is with what we say) is right, then a kind of desperation naturally
sets in when we engage in conversation about the nonexistent, for there is
nothing for that talk to be directed toward. Further, there is nothing true
or false to be said about nothing. If we have nothing as a subject of what
2 An issue that I am purposely side-stepping here is that of absolute generality, or whether there
is such a thing as an absolutely unrestricted domain available to speakers. This is a serious issue,
discussed at length in Rayo & Uzquiano [40], but it does not need to be settled for anything I have to
say here. The distinction between what Stanley/Szabo´ are doing and what I’m doing should still be
clear—I’m talking about domains that are initially associated with our quantifiers, and they’re talking
about nominal restrictions of those domains. I do talk about domains as if there is a domain of all
existing objects that always gets associated with ‘there exists’ as its unrestricted domain, and often also
with ‘there is’, while speakers sometimes intend larger domains to be associated with ‘there is’. This
should not be taken to be a robust claim about absolute generality, though. All I really need to make
the claim that I want is the idea that speakers sometimes intend to include nonexistent objects in the
unrestricted (or initial) domain when using ‘there is’, but not when using ‘there exists’. I speak more
loosely than that, operating as if it makes sense to talk about the domain of all existing obejcts, but if
that troubles you, consider the same claim in the weaker language, and it should be fine.
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we say, then we have nothing meaningful that we can say about it.3
The first part of this passage is about our ordinary grammatical intuitions—the desper-
ation discussed in the second part is a desperation felt by philosophers when we try to
grapple with discourse about the nonexistent. I take the intuitions Azzouni discusses
to be fairly stable, and I want to respect this notion that we feel strongly as if we are
directing our talk towards objects like superheroes and other nonexistent objects. So
in this section, I’ll expand on my view in a way that addresses these issues, specifically
when it comes to the domains associated with the quantifier meanings—this will be
where the action is for existentially quantified claims. The notion of truth is also cen-
tral to Azzouni’s point, and I will discuss this below, both our intuitions about the truth
of quantified claims and my view about the truth of those that purport to quantify over
nonexistent objects.
The contextualist view I’ve presented treats quantifier expressions on the model of
demonstratives (as opposed to, say, indexicals). On this view, the reference of the quan-
tifier expression, and thus also the domain associated with it, is fixed by the intentions
of the speaker. There may be no physical pointing to accompany the utterance and
lead us to a domain, but a physical pointing is not necessary. Kaplan’s remarks about
‘directing intentions’, in cases where there is no physical pointing, gives us a model that
appears to be a natural fit.
Kaplan originally thought a physical act of pointing was crucial, but he changed his
mind and came to think of “the directing intention, at least in the case of perceptual
demonstratives, as criterial,” and “the demonstration as a mere externalization of this
inner intention.”4 My use of this notion is a further extension of Kaplan’s, since exis-
tential quantifier expressions need not be perceptual in a way analogous to perceptual
demonstratives. For example, we say that when Nick, in the ordinary setting, uttered:
(2) There are superheroes who are animals but also people.
he intended to quantify over nonexistent objects. There is nothing perceptual here about
the superheroes involved—Nick is not relying on our ability to see any superheroes in
the context, or anything like that. But a quantified claim like (2) that appears to be
3 Azzouni [3], p.7.
4 Kaplan [22], pp. 582.
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straightforward and non-figurative reveals to us some information about the domain of
the quantifier meaning the speaker intends. When Nick asserts (2), the noun phrase
(‘superheroes’) after the quantifier exhibits his intention to use a quantifier whose do-
main includes objects of the sort picked out by that noun phrase (‘superheroes’). Since
superheroes do not exist, they are not in any domains; so we can say that Nick’s in-
tended domain must be one that includes nonexistent objects. This does not mean,
however, that Nick is successful in his reference attempts.
My account of such assertions is similar to what we might say about unsuccessful
uses of true demonstratives—they are instances of some kind of reference failure. In
what follows, I will discuss what that reference failure looks like for quantified claims
like (2) in an ordinary setting.
3.3.1 Non Denoting Quantifier Expressions
The main issue here is what to say about the content of a claim like (2), uttered in
an ordinary setting. The only part of (2) at issue is the domain associated with the
quantifier meaning, which is just one constituent of the proposition expressed. Because
of this, I believe the content of (2) in these settings is relevantly similar to the content
of claims that include empty names or non-referring demonstratives.
David Braun [6] [7] has done extensive work in this area, particularly in describing
and defending a view about the content of claims that include empty names. He argues
that these claims express ‘unfilled’ or ‘gappy’ propositions, i.e., propositions that just
have a gap where the object denoted by the empty name should have gone. I will accept
the main thrust of Braun’s Gappy Proposition view and align myself with his defenses
of the view. His view seems plausible in the case of empty names, and the defenses he
offers, adapted to the issue of non-referring quantifier expressions, will placate a great
many concerns someone might have about the view I’ve presented.
In the case of claims like (2), my account from the previous chapter of the content of
this claim was that it could be represented using functional notation in either of these
two ways:
(3) (THERE ARE)(SUPERHEROES)(WHO ARE ANIMALS BUT ALSO
PEOPLE)
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(4) (THERE ARE)(D)(SUPERHEROES ∩ WHO ARE ANIMALS BUT
ALSO PEOPLE)
My refined or amended claim now is that, in contexts such as the ordinary one in
which Nick is talking to his daughter Mirah, the intended domain associated with the
quantifier must be a domain that would include nonexistent objects. Nick may intend
this to be so, but since there is no such domain (which is my belief), then there can be
no domain to act as argument for the function here. With the two ways of representing
the content of Nick’s claim, we see two ways for displaying the gap in the content on
this particular utterance of it:
(5) ( )(SUPERHEROES)(WHO ARE ANIMALS BUT ALSO PEO-
PLE)
(6) (THERE ARE)( )(SUPERHEROES ∩WHO ARE ANIMALS BUT
ALSO PEOPLE)5
We see that one way of looking at it shows a gap in the content where the quantifier
meaning (i.e., the determiner function) itself should be, and the other shows a gap where
the unrestricted domain should be. My claim is that the unrestricted domain is really
part of the content of the quantifier expression, so the second way of displaying it is
really just a way of making explicit the fact that the unrestricted domain is there in
the content. These two ways may be equivalent ways of representing the content, but I
believe (5) to be the more accurate representation of the content expressed by Nick in
this ordinary context.
There are different ways we may choose to represent the content of a claim like
Nick’s. As I represent it here, we have three sections, each in parentheses. The first
represents a function and the other two represent properties. The determiner function
takes a property (the first of the two) as its argument and gives as its value another
function. That second function takes the second property as its argument and gives as
its value a truth value, i.e., the truth value of the proposition.
5 The notation used here is kind of a hybrid of two different notations. I follow Keenan [26] in
representing the content of an Aristotelian I-type sentence as ‘(THERE IS)(P1)(P2)’, and I follow
Braun [7] in using an underline to represent a gap in this content. For more on the latter convention,
see Braun [7], footnote 6, as well as Salmon [41], footnote 53.
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Looking at (5), we see that the initial determiner function is missing. So effectively
we have as content an empty space where the determiner function should be, along with
two properties, structured as arguments for functions. Since we do not have an initial
determiner function, there is also, then, no second function that would have been the
result of plugging the property of being a superhero into the first function. And since
that second function is absent, there is no truth value of the proposition, since the truth
value would be the result of the second function applied to the property of being an
animal but also a person.
We get essentially the same result from the content represented in (6), which is good,
since they should be equivalent structures. Here we have an initial determiner function,
but we are missing the first argument. This argument should be the property of being
a member of the unrestricted domain associated with the quantifier. There is no such
domain, so there is no such property. So, since we have no input for the initial function,
we are lacking a second function here as well. The result is that we have no truth value
here, either.
3.3.2 Using Non Denoting Demonstratives as a Model
Let’s consider for the sake of comparison what happens when we use a non-referring
demonstrative expression. Suppose Doris points to an empty corner of the room and
says:
(7) That polar bear is handsome.
Suppose also that she is not hallucinating—she just wants to say (7) while pointing at
the corner. Doris fails to refer to an object with her utterance of the phrase ‘that polar
bear’, though she would have been successful, had there been a polar bear in the corner
when she said it. Since her demonstration was unsuccessful, we may want to say that
what Doris expressed with her utterance of (7) was the following gappy proposition:
(8) < , being handsome>6
6 Here I assume David Kaplan’s account of demonstratives in Kaplan [22] and [23], and I also assume
a standard account of propositions that says that a sentence like (7) would normally express a singular
proposition. As above, I follow David Braun [7] in my notation conventions for gappy propositions.
Also, nothing crucial hinges here on the use of a complex demonstrative (‘that polar bear’), which some
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The initial place in the proposition is empty, since Doris’s use of the expression ‘that
polar bear’ is non-referring in this context. But the sentence she utters has a certain
structure and linguistic meaning to it, which corresponds naturally to the structure of
a singular proposition. So we may hold that this structure, along with whatever pieces
might be available, will show up at the level of semantic content. We essentially have
the structure of a regular singular proposition, and we also have the property being
handsome in its appropriate place.
I’m not going to argue for this particular view of gappy propositions, defended by
the likes of David Braun [7] and Nathan Salmon [41], at least with respect to empty
names. I will, however, discuss in more detail some of the defenses Braun gives against
certain kinds of objections that will also apply in kind to my view about the gappy
propositions expressed by certain existentially quantified claims.
What we say about situations such as Nick’s utterance of (2) in the ordinary setting
parallels this view about what happens with non-referring demonstratives. In both
cases, we have the intentions of a speaker doing some work in helping to fix the reference
of one of their expressions. For Doris, it’s ‘that polar bear’; for Nick, it’s ‘there are’.
But in both cases, the speakers intend to express something that, at least at the level
of semantic content, they cannot express—there is no such content available to them.
Doris’s polar bear does not exist, and neither does a domain that includes superheroes.
In both cases, the speaker expresses something linguistically meaningful, using normal
English words that all competent speakers understand, so there is no confusion caused
by the fact that the proposition expressed is missing something.
A natural thing to worry about with gappy propositions is whether they come out
true or false. My view is that a sentence like (2), uttered by Nick in an ordinary situation
like the one described above, lacks a truth value. The gappy proposition expressed by
Nick in this case cannot have a truth value, since any truth value a quantified claim like
this one would have is the result of a function operating on a property. But the relevant
function is absent here, so there is no operation that could produce a truth value.
such as Jeffrey King [28] may see as being a quantificational expression. We could get the same kind of
failed reference in examples with simple demonstratives, with a little more setup to the example.
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This view parts ways with David Braun somewhat. He claims that gappy proposi-
tions are all false, though his inquiry is about singular propositions expressed by sen-
tences with empty names in them.7 The fact that his view is about singular propositions
and mine is about general, quantified propositions may be enough to justify a difference
in views about truth values. My reason for saying that gappy quantified propositions
lack a truth value is primarily due to the functional aspect of them, which is not present
in Braun’s examples. But also, Braun is not actually firmly committed to the view that
they are false—he argues that it does not matter all that much whether they are false
or lack a truth value.8
The view I am presenting is an error theory, positing a relatively widespread error
among competent speakers of English. Certainly Nick takes himself to be saying some-
thing true when he asserts (2), even if he doesn’t actually care about the existence of
superheroes. But if we point out to him the tension between his assertion of (2) and
his belief that superheroes do not exist, and ask him to reflect on (2), he will realize
as well that there was something defective about his claim. I believe my view offers an
intuitive explanation of that defect.9
When people like Nick are in ordinary settings and make claims like (2), they intend
to quantify over superheroes and attribute some properties to them. They intend to
help themselves to a domain that includes superheroes, and so includes nonexistent
objects. This is their intention, even if they are not successful in what they set out to
do. We know it is their intention because of what they say, how they say it, and how
they respond if questioned about what they say. Alternatively, if someone says, “There
exist superheroes who can fly,” they are displaying their intention to limit themselves
to the group of existing objects by using the word ‘exists’.10
7 This claim is restricted to positive singular propositions—negated gappy propositions may come
out true on his view. See Braun [7], pp. 604 ff.
8 See Braun [7], pp. 607 ff.
9 Notice that this error theoretic aspect of my view draws a contrast between it and a standard
contextualist view about ‘knows’. On a contextualist view such as Stewart Cohen’s, there is no problem
with reference failure—the epistemic standards of the speaker of a sentence like, “S knows that P,” fixes
the semantic value of the knowledge claim. So in a low-standards context, an utterance of, “S knows
that P,” may express something true, even though the same sentence may express something false if
uttered by the same person in a high-standards context. See, for example, Cohen [12] for details of his
view, and I will also pick this topic up again in Chapter 5.
10 Other ways we may linguistically make our intentions clear is to modify our claims with expressions
such as ‘really’, ‘actually’, ‘in our minds’, and so on. Such modifications may alter the context of the
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Recall that the data discussed in Chapter 1 about ontological robustness, data that
motivates this entire view, is about the appearance of truth and falsity, viz. the appear-
ance of truth in one context and falsity in another, with respect to the same claim. We
don’t begin with the data that claims like (2) are true, but rather that they seem prima
facie to be true. We hear them as true, and we assert them and treat them as if they
are true, even if we might be mistaken about that.
My demonstrative view has a nice, elegant answer to why a claim like (2) appears
true in ordinary contexts and false in ontological ones. This answer is that in ordinary
contexts, we intend to refer to a quantifier meaning whose domain includes nonexistent
objects like superheroes. But then, when we shift to discussing ontology, we now intend
to refer to a quantifier meaning whose domain includes only objects that exist. This
explains our inclination to see (2) as true in some settings and false in others, regardless
of whether (2) actually is ever true, or even whether (2) ever actually expresses a
complete, non-gappy proposition.
It should not be a surprise that our intuitions about the truth-value of some of
our ordinary claims may be misguided or mistaken. Of course it is always a goal of a
speaker, at least when making sincere assertions, to say something true. But propo-
sitions and truth-values are mysterious enough for linguists and philosophers to have
serious disputes about their workings and natures, so there’s no reason to expect ordi-
nary speakers, however competent, to get everything right in this respect. This excuse
is not a catch-all that allows us to explain away all problems, but I do believe it’s
appropriate here.
Suppose we asked Nick whether he thought he was saying something true to his
daughter Mirah when he uttered (2) in his conversation to her. His initial response
would be something like, “Sure, I suppose so.” Truth would have been a goal of his at
some level, but not the primary concern. If we pressed him on the matter—the way we
might if we were interested in Quine’s ontological commitment process—he may retract
his claim. But he may say other things that lead in different directions, too. He may
maintain that superheroes exist in our minds, or that they exist as stories. He may
say things that will line up with any number of different ontological views, and he may
discussion or the target quantifier meaning, though some of them may also be idiomatic expressions
that serve simply as emphasis of an assertion that need not change the context.
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have no confident beliefs about any of them. But one thing that will not change is that,
faced with a similar situation, he would be happy to say (2) again.
In light of this, it seems reasonable to say that when it comes to Nick’s intentions
that go along with his assertion of (2), there may be some complications. He may
have all kinds of intentions—the intention to inform his daughter, to placate her, to say
something true, etc. His linguistic intentions are all I’m concerned with—what is it that
he intended to say? Even here, it’s clearly complicated. But it should be reasonable to
say that the words Nick chooses display some linguistic intentions on their sleeves. If he
uses an existential quantifier expression in a way that quantifies over superheroes, then
there is at least a prima facie intention to quantify over superheroes that we cannot
deny. This intention gives us a starting point—we look at the words used and begin
with the most straightforward and minimal way of interpreting it. And this starting
point helps us explain why we have the intuitions about them that we have, viz. the
intuition that we’re saying something true (even if we’re not). We have some kind of
intention to quantify over superheroes, and we make a claim that would be a true one
if superheroes did exist, so the claim has an appropriate kind of ring of truth to it.
3.3.3 Believing Gappy Propositions
Another kind of explanation we might offer about why we take our quantified claims to
be true even when they do not actually have a truth value is that we believe them. I will
offer a brief explanation of this path, though I do not want to get too side-tracked from
the primary issue. Since I have been accepting much of David Braun’s machinery of
gappy propositions and the ability to believe gappy propositions is central to his view,
it seems useful to discuss this issue.11
Continuing with the superhero example, we may say that Nick believes the propo-
sition represented by (5), even though it’s a gappy proposition. He holds this belief, in
part, because he does not realize that it’s gappy. The content of his belief has a hole in
it, but he’s not aware of this, so he believes it anyway. This explanation fits with the
fact that, as we can see by the entire context and the other things Nick says to Mirah,
he must be taking himself to be quantifying over nonexistent objects, helping himself
11 Braun [7], p. 608, discusses the belief of gappy propositions in the context of his discussion on
empty names.
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to a domain that is larger than the domain of all existing objects. He doesn’t realize
that there is no such domain, so he plows forward with language that indicates that he
intends to help himself to it. So there is a gap in the content of his assertion and of his
belief, but that gap doesn’t concern him in this ordinary context.
Braun gives a ‘Twin Earth’ example to illustrate why it is not so implausible to
think that we might believe gappy propositions, and I’ll modify it a bit here. Suppose
Becky and Twin Becky would both assent to the claim, “Napoleon is a general.” Becky
lives on Earth, where ‘Napoleon’ refers to the French general, but Twin Becky lives on
Twin Earth, where everything is twin-similar, except for ‘Napoleon’ being an empty
name. There are stories about the French general named ‘Napoleon’, and those legends
sound just like our history. Furthermore, everyone takes them to be true stories—it’s
lost to the annals of history that Napoleon did not exist. Now, Becky believes that
Napoleon is a general, so she stands in the belief relation to the proposition:
(9) < pNapoleonq, being a general>
But from the inside, i.e., with respect to their intrinsic mental states, Becky and Twin
Becky are the same. The only difference is that the proposition to which Twin Becky
is related is the following gappy proposition:
(10) < , being a general>
It is reasonable to think that Twin Becky, being in the mental state that she is in, is
standing in the belief relation to the proposition expressed here as (10).
This analysis rests on some assumptions about what it is to believe a proposition,
and about the sorts of mental states that believers are in when they believe. Braun
discusses his view about this in the following passage:
On the metaphysics I favor, standing in the belief relation to a proposition
requires that one be in a certain type of intrinsic mental state. These mental
states are intrinsic in the following sense: you and your Twin Earth dop-
pelga¨nger have the same types of mental states of this sort, even though you
believe different propositions. For instance, there is a type of intrinsic men-
tal state that you share with your Twin Earth doppelga¨nger which underlies
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your believing that Aristotle was a philosopher, but which underlies your
doppelga¨nger’s believing that Twin Aristotle was a philosopher. You and
Twin You differ in what you believe, despite the intrinsic similarity in your
mental states, because your mental states stand in different causal relations
to Aristotle and Twin Aristotle. These causal relations involve utterances
of proper names such as ‘Aristotle’: Your utterances of the name ‘Aristotle’
refer to Aristotle, whereas your Twin’s utterances refer to Twin Aristotle.12
On this kind of view, we see how we might make sense of someone believing a gappy
proposition. If we accept Braun’s account here, we say that the two twins are in the
same mental state with respect to their own world’s propositions about Aristotle and
Twin Aristotle, even though these are different propositions. The intrinsic state they
are in, then, must not rely crucially on the constituents of the proposition itself, at
least with respect to the actual identity of Aristotle. If we can change the Aristotle who
populates the proposition without changing the intrinsic state of the believer, then some
aspect of Aristotle does not matter to the intrinsic state. Looking back at the Napoleon
case, too, we see that sometimes our beliefs are formed due to misinformation, but
the internal state we are in may be the same, regardless of whether Napoleon himself
even shows up in the proposition at all. So while the content of our belief may be a
proposition, the intrinsic state we are in is a different animal from the proposition, and
gappy-ness does not necessarily affect it.
If we accept this account that makes sense of what it might be to believe gappy
propositions, then we can see a way to placate the worry about our intuitions that Nick
is saying something true when he utters (2) in an ordinary context. Our intuitions
are rooted in the fact that speakers like Nick may actually believe (2). It is neither
incoherent nor even all that strange for us to have beliefs that purport to be about
nonexistent objects. Now, when pressed, we may choose to give up that belief, in which
case we may also retract our previous assertion. But that does not mean that we didn’t
believe it earlier. In fact, such retractions lend some amount of support to the view
that ‘there is’ claims are context-sensitive: we happily assert them in ordinary settings,
backed up by beliefs we may be expressing, but when we are pushed to more critical
12 Braun [7], p. 601, emphasis in original.
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(possibly philosophical) settings, where our beliefs are changed or more refined, we may
not be willing to assert the same claim anymore. One important part that has changed,
I maintain, is the domain of objects that we’re attempting to help ourselves to from
context to context.
3.3.4 Reference Magnetism and Speaker Intentions
Why are Nick’s intentions so important? You may agree that Nick intends to quantify
over nonexistent objects when he utters (2) in an ordinary setting, but you may also
think that his intentions are not the most powerful thing in play here. One way this line
of objection could run is to follow Ted Sider’s use of David Lewis’s notion of ‘reference
magnetism’.
This discussion begins with a disagreement between Ted Sider and Eli Hirsch about
the consequences of accepting some notion of Quantifier Variance.13 Quantifier Variance
is essentially the view that there are many acceptable candidate meanings (i.e., quan-
tifiers) for our existential quantifier expressions. Hirsch thinks that when, e.g., David
Lewis says, “There are tables”, and Peter van Inwagen says, “No, there are not”, the
best way to make sense of this dispute is to attribute to each philosopher a different
quantifier meaning for their utterances of ‘there are’. Hirsch takes charity considera-
tions to push us towards making a strong effort to interpret people as speaking truly,
if we can, and attributing quantifiers with different domains (Lewis’s larger than van
Inwagen’s) will do just that.
Sider’s response is to admit that these other quantifiers are proper candidates for the
meaning of ‘there are’ in their sentences, but also to claim that charity considerations
don’t trump the ‘reference magnetism’ of the best candidate meaning, viz. the quantifier
with the domain of objects that exist. Sider thinks Lewis and van Inwagen’s existential
quantifier expressions refer to the same quantifier: the plain, unrestricted existential
quantifier. The notion of ‘reference magnetism’ is meant to parallel Lewis’s views about
naturalness in his explanations for how our predicates successfully refer to certain (more
natural) properties rather than other (less natural) ones.14 Sider extends Lewis’s notion
of ‘naturalness’ to logical notions. He claims that the unrestricted existential quantifier
13 See Sider [43] and Hirsch [18] for full discussions of this matter.
14 See Lewis [29], especially pp. 13 ff.
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‘carves the world at its logical joints’ better than any other quantifier with a restricted
or possibly gerrymandered domain.
The notion of reference magnetism itself is fairly plausible—or at least easy enough to
understand—in many cases. It is rooted in a particular view of meaning that Ted Sider
and David Lewis both accept. The following two passages will explain and illustrate this
general view. First, Ted Sider gives a general statement about this theory of meaning:
On this view, meaning is determined by two sources. Nearly everyone agrees
that we play a role. Perhaps this role is played by convention: a complex
pattern of behavior and dispositions of the speaker and her language com-
munity. Or perhaps a more individualistic account focused solely on the
speaker is correct. The second source is the controversial one: of the many
candidate meanings (whatever their ontological status), not all are created
equal. Some are intrinsically more eligible to be meant than others. This
eligibility is starkly metaphysical in nature: some candidate meanings ‘carve
nature at the joints’ more than others, and it is part of the nature of refer-
ence and meaning that candidates that carve nature at its joints are more
eligible to be meant. The meaning of a word, then, is the best candidate,
where strength of candidacy is based on (1) fit with meaning-determining
facts about the speaker or her linguistic community, and (2) intrinsic eligi-
bility on the part of the candidate. For short, meaning supervenes on use
plus eligibility.15
And next, we have an example from David Lewis:
The thesis that indeterminacy in nature is multiplicity fits well with the the-
sis that indeterminacy in language is semantic indecision: there are many
clouds, and we haven’t decided just which one to call ‘the cloud’. Neverthe-
less, the two are separable. Maybe instead ‘the cloud’ refers to the entire
multiplicity; or maybe just one of the many—but it is a secret which one—is
a mighty reference magnet, and so ‘the cloud’ refers to that one.16
15 Sider [42], p. xxi.
16 Lewis [32], footnote 2.
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The idea here is that if it turns out that there really is one privileged collection of
particles that constitutes an object that would most properly be called ‘the cloud’, then
when we utter the phrase ‘the cloud’, it may turn out that this privileged object will
magnetically draw the reference of our utterance to it. It may be that if we only had
better powers of observation or better understanding of clouds, we would realize that,
even though clouds get kind of hazy around the edges, there really are sharp boundaries
that demarcate the cloud from the air around it. And so it may be that there is just
one well-defined object floating through the sky, changing its shape but remaining that
one object. So, whether we know it or not, when we point to it and refer to it as ‘the
cloud’, we’re really referring just to that one object.
This notion may get extended to solve problems such as how it’s possible, and even
likely, that we are talking about the same things when we use the same terms. Given
that our introductions to words like ‘tiger’ may be radically different from each other,
we may have all kinds of different ideas about tigers, maybe even conflicting thoughts
about some of the details about the animals. But if I say, “Tigers are ferocious,” and
you say, “No, tigers aren’t ferocious—tenacious maybe, but not ferocious,” we’d like to
think that it’s pretty obvious that we’re talking about the same thing. So this view could
say that the property of being a tiger is a very natural property, and thus a ‘mighty
reference magnet’. This can help explain why, among all the (complex, gerrymandered)
properties we could possibly be referring to when we use the word ‘tiger’, we both end
up referring to the same property.
Now, as mentioned above, Lewis’s view is about properties, specifically about how
some properties carve nature at its joints closer than others. Sider’s extension of this
view is to quantifier meanings, claiming that, since these are ‘logical’ entities, it can make
sense to say that some of them might carve nature at its ‘logical’ joints more closely
than others. To put this in terms that fit with the discussion we’ve had so far (which,
I believe, is a fair characterization of Sider’s [43] view), Sider says that the domain of
objects that exist is the most logically natural one. Sider also thinks that there are no
nonexistent objects, so the domain of all the objects that exist would be the largest one
available to us. So when we use a quantifier, he maintains that the unrestricted domain
that will magnetically draw our reference is the domain of everything that exists.
It’s unclear exactly what Sider would say about Nick’s assertion of (2). In the case
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of two philosophers arguing about ontology, Sider’s claim is that they both mean the
same thing when they use existential quantifier expressions like ‘there is’ or ‘there exists’
(which Sider follows Lewis in not distinguishing between). It’s reasonable in this case
to think that, since both philosophers are arguing about which objects exist, their use
of ‘there is’ will be associated with the unrestricted domain of all the objects that exist.
In this case I agree with Sider, since, in accordance with my contextualist view, if we
are in a context where the explicit task at hand is to discuss existence and which objects
exist, then not only will our use of ‘there exists’ refer to a quantifier meaning with the
domain of all objects that exist (as it always does, I maintain), but so will our use of
‘there is’, since it adapts to the intended domain of the speaker in the context.
But what about Nick’s assertion in the ordinary setting? In addition to his assertion
of (2), recall that he also asserted, nearly in the same breath, that superheroes do not
exist. Is it fair, then, to think that, against his own will and intentions, the domain of
everything that exists magnetically draws the reference of Nick’s use of ‘there are’? I
think that we should say that Nick’s intentions trump the reference magnetism of the
domain of objects that exist here. Recall Sider’s own view of meaning in the passage
quoted above. His claim is that the content of an expression involves a balanced effort
between the intent of the speaker (or community) and the fitness of the candidate
meanings. It doesn’t follow that the most elegant candidate meanings will always be
the ones to which our expressions refer—if intentions play a role here, they must be able
to trump reference magnetism at times. It seems reasonable to think that this is one
of those times, especially when Nick explicitly states that the objects he’s quantifying
over do not exist.
I am happy to accept the general picture of quantifier meaning given by Sider. But
the picture as it works out in this case of Nick in the ordinary setting appears to be
as follows: Nick has a clear intention to quantify over superheroes, displayed by the
claims he makes. But Nick also has an explicit belief that superheroes do not exist.
The domain of all objects that exist, being the largest domain available for reference
(and also quite ‘logically natural’, if we follow Sider there), will have some amount of
magnetic pull.
We can anthropomorphize this situation (perhaps a bit ridiculously) and imagine
the domain of objects that exist having ears that perk up at the use of an existential
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quantifier expression. It then reaches up with its magnetic fingers, trying to latch on to
Nick’s use of ‘there is’ and pull it down to itself. But in this case, Nick’s intentions are
not interested in this particular domain, since he doesn’t believe superheroes exist, so
they swat away the outstretched limbs of the domain of existing objects and then reach
out further for a larger domain that might include nonexistent objects. Unfortunately,
they are grasping at nonexistent straws, and they won’t be able to find anything beyond
the domain they just rebuffed. But to give in to the natural domain of what exists would
mean that Nick said something false in this case—since there are no superheroes in the
domain of existing objects, there will be none in there who are both animal and human.
His intentions will reach out for a domain that will at least give his claim the potential
of saying something true, even if it ends up having to settle for a gappy proposition that
has no truth value.
Before moving on to the next chapter, I’ll briefly tie together the moving pieces of
this section. My goal here has been to fill out some of the details of my view, specifically
about the issue of the domains associated with quantifier meanings. Since I claim that
‘there is’ is context-sensitive in a way that results in a certain kind of semantic failure in
some contexts, this clarification seems necessary. As Azzouni points out, we can feel a
kind of desperation kick in when we realize that we think we’re talking about something,
but really we’re talking about nothing.
The way I have dealt with these issues in this section are as follows: first, my con-
textualist view of ‘there is’ is modeled on the context-sensitivity of demonstratives;
second, what fixes a domain in a context where a ‘there is’ claim is uttered are the in-
tentions of the speaker; third, reference failure with existentially quantified claims, when
it happens, looks relevantly similar to reference failure with demonstratives; fourth, the
machinery of gappy propositions gives us a tool to explain the content of the problematic
existentially quantified claims; fifth, linguistic meaning allows us a way of saying how
these claims are meaningful, understood, etc.; sixth, the gappy propositions in ques-
tion are truth-value-less, but this fact is opaque to ordinary speakers who (reasonably
enough) take themselves to be saying something true; seventh, at least on some views
about beliefs, it may be reasonable to see speakers as believing gappy propositions too;
eighth, the phenomenon of reference magnetism may add to our picture of how existen-
tial quantifier expressions latch on to domains; ninth, reference magnetism reinforces
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the thought that ‘there exists’ is invariant, since the domain of existing objects will
magnetically attract it; and tenth, even with the reference magnetism picture, we can
still make sense of how the speaker’s intentions play a role in breaking the magnetic
attraction of the domain of existing objects in a case where the speaker clearly wants
to quantify over nonexistent objects.
I believe these ten moving pieces fit together in a relatively harmonious way to give
us a picture of one small part of our discourse about nonexistent objects. In ordinary
settings, we want to talk about things that we ourselves don’t think exist, and this
is inherently confusing. But we go ahead with it anyway and let the chips fall where
they may. These problems arise with existentially quantified claims, just as they do
with empty names and failed demonstratives. My primary view I am presenting and
defending in this dissertation is the contextualist view developed in Chapter 2, but with
that as my central view, I also must pay heed to its implications and say how we can
make sense of our ordinary discourse about nonexistent objects in a way consistent with
the view. That has been the task here. Now, moving forward to the next chapter, I
will discuss the main competitor to my contextualist view and give a holistic argument
that my view fares better on balance than the competitor.
Chapter 4
Contextualism Over Orthodoxy
4.1 Introduction
First, let’s briefly recap the previous three chapters. In Chapter 1, I introduced the
notion of ‘ontological robustness’, which is essentially a tool to help us think about
the ontological thick- or thinness of a claim. Going through several examples, I ar-
gued that ‘there is’ claims sometimes are and sometimes are not ontologically robust,
depending on the context in which they’re uttered. Additionally, I argued that ‘there
exist’ claims are always ontologically robust, regardless of context. In Chapter 2, I pre-
sented my contextualist view of ‘there is’, discussing the semantics of quantifiers and
the demonstrative-like features of ‘there is’. In Chapter 3, I addressed a few issues that
were raised earlier, elaborating on them and addressing some potential objections to my
view, centering on issues about the domain associated with the existential quantifier.
Next, in this chapter, I will discuss the primary opposition to my view, where it
comes from and in what ways I disagree with it. In doing this, I will be establishing
the main argument of this dissertation. Up until now, I have primarily been presenting
and defending my view about the context sensitivity of ‘there is’. A companion view
that I’ve discussed some and argued for a little is the view that ‘there exists’ is not
context sensitive. One of the main purposes of articulating these views, however, is to
build an argument against the orthodox view about the meaning of existential quantifier
expressions. The orthodox view says that, as David Lewis puts it, all of the existential
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quantifier expressions are “entirely synonymous and interchangeable”.1 A result of my
view that I’ve been presenting and defending is that this claim of orthodoxy is false. If
‘there is’ is a context-sensitive expression and ‘there exists’ is not, then they are neither
synonymous nor (entirely) interchangeable.
The current form of this orthodox view is rooted in Quine, so I will spend a little
time here discussing his statement and explanation of his view. His view appears to
be at least tacitly accepted by a majority of contemporary metaphysicians, so there
are not a great deal of variations on the orthodox theme. There is a little bit of the
logical space of competing views that has been explored by other philosophers in the
past several decades, so I’ll discuss some of that here as well. But since the Quinian view
is the primary competitor, it will be the main focus of this chapter. Once we have the
details of this view on the table, I will then give a new argument for my contextualist
view, on the grounds that it gives as good as or better of an account of the data that
needs to be accounted for by a view like these than the Quinian view. This will be
a holistic argument, comparing two general accounts of the meaning of the existential
quantifier expressions ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ and weighing their relative merits.
4.2 Quine’s View of Existential Quantifier Expressions
The roots of the orthodox view about existential quantifier expressions appear to be in
Quine’s metaontological views. Peter van Inwagen gives a nice summary of five tenets
of Quinian metaontology as follows:
1. Being is not an activity
2. Being is the same as existence
3. Being is univocal
4. The single sense of being or existence is adequately captured by the existential
quantifier of formal logic
5. General strategy for answering the ontological question, i.e., the criterion of onto-
logical commitment2
1 Lewis [30], p. 24.
2 These are the headings of the sections of van Inwagen [47], except for 5, which isn’t given a heading.
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Since my focus is on the meaning of the expressions ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’, the
second and third tenets are the most relevant ones to this project. The first is an
Austinian point that is not a claim about language or quantifiers; it’s about whether
existence or being is something we do or not. The way J. L. Austin expressed it was
that we should not think of existence as merely, “like breathing, only quieter.”3
The fourth is primarily a point about regimentation and the purpose of the existen-
tial quantifier symbol ‘∃’. I don’t have any problems with translation into formal logic
itself, though this regimentation can sneak in or rely on some of the other tenets. That
is a problem with the other tenets, though, not the translation one.
The fifth tenet is one that I discussed some in Chapter 1, when introducing and
using the notion of ontological robustness. There I discussed how, though evaluating
a claim for its ontological robustness status does bear some similarity to the process
of ferreting out our ontological commitments, it is not quite the same as the process
suggested by Quine’s criterion. The ontological robustness status of a claim indicates
our current ontological intentions, regardless of whether we actually have views about
ontology. Quine’s method could be seen as a sort of ontological therapy, where we can
dredge up our deep dark secrets (say, a latent nominalism or a suppressed idealism) and
examine them in the light of day, where we’re forced to come to terms with or reject
them. I don’t have any issues with his criterion, especially since it is in most respects
orthogonal to my interests.
The two tenets that I’m interested in, the second and third, combine to form the
view that I’m arguing against, though not completely transparently. By ‘being is the
same as existence’, I take Quine to be saying that ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ mean
essentially the same thing. And by ‘being is univocal’, I take Quine to be saying not
just that ‘there is’ is not ambiguous (which he is saying), but also that the expression
is not context-sensitive. Neither of these amendments or interpretations are explicit in
van Inwagen’s summary of Quine’s metaontology, but I think it is fair to attribute them
to Quine as well as to the general view I take to be the orthodox view, found in Lewis
and others.
To discuss Quine directly first, I’ll focus on two articles of his where he discusses the
relevant aspects of his metaontological view. The first is “On What There Is” (1948),
3 Austin [2], p. 68n
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and the second is “Existence and Quantification” (1960), and I’ll look at them each
briefly, in turn.
4.2.1 “On What There Is”
Quine [36] was an influential article that helped reinvigorate metaphysics in the wake of
the bad taste for it left in everyone’s mouths by the logical positivists. In terms of tone
and style, this article was one of the shapers of the orthodox practice of metaphysics for
the past six decades. It is not the main thrust of the article, but one thing that Quine
does here is to articulate some of his metaontological assumptions. The most relevant
bit of this for our current interests comes in the following footnote:
The impulse to distinguish terminologically between existence as applied to
objects actualized somewhere in space-time and existence (or subsistence or
being) as applied to other entities arises, in part, perhaps, from an idea that
the observation of nature is relevant only to questions of existence of the
first kind. But this idea is readily refuted by counter-instances such as ‘the
ratio of the number of centaurs to the number of unicorns’. If there were
such a ratio, it would be an abstract entity, viz. a number. Yet it is only
by studying nature that we conclude that the number of centaurs and the
number of unicorns are both 0 and hence that there is no such ratio.4
For the sake of brevity, let’s give the two senses of existence he discusses here the
following names:
E1 existence as applied to objects actualized somewhere in space and time
E2 existence (or subsistence or being) as applied to other entities
Quine does not himself think that these are two legitimate senses of existence. He is
attributing this to his opponent, which here is the Meinongian, who holds that some
objects have being even if they don’t exist. Quine is also being a little unclear here
about whether the distinction in question is between the two properties existence and
being, or between words associated with these properties, such as ‘is’ and ‘exists’. He
4 Quine [36], p. 3, n. 1
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does say that this impulse is to distinguish terminologically between the two senses,
which makes it sound like his focus is really on expressions like ‘is’ and ‘exists’. He may
be intending both, but since my focus here is just on the meaning of these words, I’ll
limit my discussion to that aspect. It’s unclear whether Quine is really intending to
give an argument for his position, but if he is, it would appear to be the following:
P1 The motivation for distinguishing between E1 and E2 is that observing nature only
tells us about what exists in the E1 sense.
P2 But observing nature can also tell us about what exists in the E2 sense (e.g., ratio
of number of centaurs to number of unicorns).
C So the distinction between E1 and E2 is unmotivated.
Now this argument could be read in a way that connects with either of the two tenets
of Quinian metaontology that I’m interested in. On the one hand, this could be about
Quine’s denial that there is a difference between ‘is’ and ‘exists’; on the other hand,
this could be about Quine’s claim that ‘existence’ is univocal, so there is not more than
one sense of the word. I read Quine as intending his claims to do double-duty, based
mainly on the way he introduces E2 as “existence (or subsistence or being)”. That
seems to indicate that we might read this as an argument about two senses of existence,
or, if someone wants to say this other sense of existence is captured by other words like
‘subsistence’ or ‘being’, the argument will apply to them as well.
The argument itself is, indirectly, an application of Leibniz’s Law. Quine is basically
saying that the Meinongian thinks there’s a property that E1 has but E2 lacks (a
property about the fruitfulness of observing nature). And since they have different
properties, they must be different meanings. But Quine claims (in his second premise)
that E2 also has the property in question. So we can’t use Leibniz’s Law and this
property about observing nature to drive a wedge between E1 and E2. And, if that’s
the only property that could plausibly distinguish between E1 and E2, then Leibniz’s
Law will tell us that they really are the same meanings.
This argument is a bit confusing, but there are a couple ways to approach it that
will undercut its effectiveness in relation to my own interests. If our focus is on why
we might want to distinguish terminologically between existence and being, then Quine
presumably means to attack a difference in meaning between expressions like ‘exists’
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and ‘is’. If this is the case, then P1 must be false, since we have other motivations
for why we may want to distinguish between them aside from issues about observing
nature. The case of discourse about fiction provides such an example—we may believe
that superheroes don’t exist, but we may still want to make claims that purport to
quantify over superheroes. That on its own is a motivation for distinguishing between
‘exists’ and ‘is’, or ‘there exists’ and ‘there is’.
If Quine’s focus is more on the properties involved, the worry about distinguishing
between existence and being in a metaphysical discussion, then this argument is not in
the realm of what I’m interested in. I am not arguing for a Meinongian ontology, just
a point about the meaning of existential quantifier expressions. These two issues can
be conflated too easily, as they appear to be (at least somewhat) in this passage from
Quine.
I should also note that if Quine’s points are about language—as they should be,
given the inclusion of ‘terminologically’—but only intended to be about how we might
talk during a philosophical discussion, then I don’t have grounds to disagree with him
here either. On my view, since ‘there is’ is context-sensitive, if we are having an explicit
discussion of ontology, ‘there is’ will take on the same meaning as ‘there exists’, since
the speaker will be intending to help herself only to the domain of objects that exist.
So in a discussion of ontology, it is reasonable to resist someone’s attempts to make a
distinction between ‘exists’ and ‘is’ (unless the discussion is about Meinongianism, say,
and it is part of the issue at hand in that discussion).
4.2.2 “Existence and Quantification”
In Quine [39], he is responding to to Carnap’s worries that we cannot meaningfully
ask existence questions that make use of Allwo¨rter, or category words. Quine has two
responses to this. One is that we have no principled way to determine what is a category
word and what isn’t. The other response is basically the intuition that we have to be able
to make sense of what Carnap would consider external or categorical existence questions
or claims in order to make sense of what people are doing when they try to get out of
being committed to various things.5 It seems reasonable to think that someone who
goes through a lot of trouble creating a system of paraphrasing so they don’t have to
5 Quine [39], pp. 92–93
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actually use, say, number terms, has a belief that numbers categorically do not exist. So
basically, Quine thinks that ontological disputes or questions are intuitively substantive,
and he thinks that intuition counts against Carnap’s view.
My current interest in Quine [39] is his discussion of and argument for the views
that ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ mean the same thing and that these expressions are
univocal.6 Quine begins this discussion by entertaining the notion that there are two
kinds of existence, a philosophical and a commonsensical sense. The proponent of
this kind of view may be someone like an immaterialist, who thinks that objects like
rabbits don’t exist in the philosophical sense, but they do in the commonsensical sense.
Basically, what this would mean is that they think it’s perfectly fine to talk about
rabbits and quantify over them in ordinary talk, but when it comes to the philosophical
room, the immaterialist no longer allows quantification over rabbits. When things get
serious, they claim that only “qualities, times, and places”7 exist, no rabbits or other
ordinary objects.
The target of Quine’s view is a sort of ambiguity view that is not something all
immaterialists would be committed to; it’s just one option for someone who wants to
deny the existence of rabbits, say, but still wants to say we can make true claims where
we’re quantifying over rabbits. We could do this if our quantifier expressions were
ambiguous in the right way, so the sentence, “There is a rabbit in the yard,” could be
read as having two legitimately different meanings.
Quine is somewhat comfortable with the immaterialist going on as if there is an
ambiguity here. This is because the two different meanings would not really both be
quantificational meanings. That is, on the common sense reading of the claim, the
immaterialist would have to say that there isn’t really quantification going on—the
meaning of ‘there is’ there would have to be serving some other function.8 So Quine
6 Leading up to this argument, Quine discusses a few other of the claims that van Inwagen points
out as tenets of Quinian metaontology, discussed above. For example, he says, “Existence is what
existential quantification expresses. There are things of kind F if and only if (∃x)Fx.” (p. 97) In this
context, Quine doesn’t see treat this as a substantial thesis—he is basically just pointing out how we
generally explain the symbolic notation.
7 Quine [39], p. 98
8 Quine is not too clear about how this would work, but that’s forgivable, since it’s not his view. The
main thing he says about it is that for the immaterialist, the common sense reading would have the same
“stimulus meaning” for them as for us (98), but not the same meaning with respect to quantification.
A view like Hofweber [20] could likely fill out this sort of distinction in a way that would maybe work
for the kind of immaterialist Quine has in mind.
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is not worried about there being two different kinds of quantification. He doesn’t think
there’s an ambiguity here at all, but even if there were, he thinks, it wouldn’t be between
two different quantifier meanings. It would be between two different meanings of the
quantifier expressions, one of which was a quantifier meaning and the other of which
was something else, something distinct from quantification.
It is important to note here that what Quine is after is not particular to the issue of
materialism vs. immaterialism. These comments are general claims about the meaning
of quantifier expressions, and he means to apply them across different debates. The
other example he brings up is that of nominalism about numbers, where people who
don’t believe in the existence of numbers may still want to talk as if they exist when
they’re doing math, but then be more careful in the philosophy room.
The discussion about the immaterialist and the nominalist is Quine’s setup for the
argument he gives in the following passage:
It has been fairly common in philosophy early and late to distinguish be-
tween being, as the broadest concept, and existence, as narrower. This is no
distinction of mine; I mean “exists” to cover all there is, and such of course
is the force of the quantifier. For those who do make the distinction, the ex-
istent tends to be on the concrete or temporal side. Now there was perhaps
a reminder of the distinction in the case of the rabbit and the immaterialist.
At that point two senses of “there is,” a common and a philosophical, threat-
ened to diverge. Perhaps the divergence which that sort of case suggests has
been one factor in making philosophers receptive to a distinction between
existence and being. Anyway, it ought not to. For the point there was that
the rabbit was not a value of the immaterialist’s variables; thus existence,
if this were the analogy, would not be a species of being. Moreover, we say
that the sensible materiality of the rabbit was inessential to the example,
since the prime numbers between 10 and 20 sustained much the same point.9
What Quine seems to be saying here is that the sort of motivation some (though not
Quine) might make use of to posit an ambiguity could just as well motivate the same
people in a different direction, towards distinguishing between existence and being.
9 Quine [39], p. 100
78
Notice that this move has a parallel in “On What There Is”, at least on my reading
of his footnote argument there as being meant to do double duty, counting in favor
of two separate tenets of his metaontology. Here as well he is lumping them together,
saying essentially that the motivation someone might have for positing an ambiguity in
‘there exists’ could also lead one to think that ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ have different
meanings. His aim is to undercut this motivation for both purposes.
Quine appears to be saying here that if we were to distinguish between existence
and being (which he himself does not want to do), the natural view we might choose is
to say that being is more encompassing than existence. That is, the things that exist
are a subclass of the things that are, a subclass such as the one of just concrete, present
objects. The specifics of which subclass is the right one (i.e., do they really have to
be present?) do not matter to our current worry—it’s enough to say that the existent
group would be smaller in some natural or intuitive way than the group of all things
that have being. This would capture the immaterialist and nominalist worries, as well
as many others. Given this setup, I see Quine’s argument for his position in this passage
as follows:
P1 If ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ picked out different quantifier meanings, the difference
between them would be that the domain of the latter would be smaller than the
former in some natural way (e.g., including only present concreta).
P2 But then people (philosophers especially) who think certain things don’t exist
should deny ‘there exists’ claims while assenting to the corresponding ‘there is’
claims.
P3 This isn’t what happens—when pressed to say what they really think (e.g., “in the
philosophy room”), they don’t want the objects in question to be values of their
variables, and they tend to deny both the ‘there exists’ and ‘there is’ claims.
C1 So ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ must not pick out different quantifier meanings.
C2 So existence is not a species of being.
I take P1 to come from Quine’s discussion of those people who want to make the
sorts of distinctions that he himself does not want to. Whether we’re talking about an
ambiguity view or a view that separates existence and being, he thinks that the split
they’re positing must be along some natural or intuitive line, such as the line between
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physical and non-physical objects or between present and non-present objects.10 The
point is that P1 is based both on what sort of distinction would be reasonable and
also on what sort of distinction has been common with Quine’s opponents like the
Meinongians. I don’t see P1 as particularly problematic.
Quine doesn’t explicitly say P2, but it seems reasonable to attribute it to him, since
it seems to be needed for this argument. For Quine, the issue of whether some object is
the value of a variable for someone is an issue of what we can get them to assent to when
they’re pressed on it. We can’t just attribute objects to them based on what we think
they believe—we have to ask them and see what sentences they would agree to when
all the cards are on the table. And he thinks we should only hold them accountable for
the objects they admit at that point.11
Quine seems to think that the conclusion (that existence is not a species of being)
follows from the fact that the objects in question would not be considered as values of
variables for the people who don’t think they exist, which is P3 above. For example, in
the rabbit case, Quine thinks that the immaterialist, when pressed to say what he really
thinks is true, will want to paraphrase away any quantification over rabbits. That is,
he won’t want rabbits to be values of his variables.
From these premises, Quine thinks it follows that existence is not a species of being,
but that claim, for him, seems to be just a specification of what I’ve given as C1,
put in terms of the meaning of the existential quantifier expressions. Notice that C1
is essentially the same as the Lewisian position that all of the existential quantifier
expressions are ‘entirely synonymous and interchangeable’.
The main problem with this argument is that even if people behave in the way
Quine thinks they will (illustrated in P2 and P3 of the argument), there may be other
explanations for their behavior. It may be true that when we’re in the philosophy room,
the immaterialist will decide to be careful and not quantify over rabbits using either
‘there exists’ or ‘there is’. But, as Quine himself points out, outside of the philosophy
room, the immaterialist goes around quantifying over rabbits in ordinary discourse, at
10 We might also include the split between actual and non-actual objects here, since it fits with the
sort of characterization we’re giving of Quine’s opponents, even if Quine doesn’t bring up modal worries
here.
11 This is that fifth tenet of Quine’s metaontology, his criterion of ontological commitment. See, for
example, Quine [38], pp. 242-43.
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least using ‘there is’. This is not an insignificant point—we need to worry about why
this should happen.
This is where my discussion in Chapter 1 about ontological robustness becomes
important. Quine appears to think that the best way to decide what the existential
quantifier expressions really mean is to look at how we use them once we’re engaged in
the process of determining our ontological commitments. It seems to me that it’s better
to look at the whole picture of our usage, when we’re in ordinary settings and when
we’re in ontological settings. The activity of digging into our ontological commitments
is a kind of technical activity, in the sense that we may end up using technical or
simplified or sharpened versions of certain words. If we really want to know what they
mean, we should look at both these technical uses and also the normal, everyday uses
of competent speakers.
4.3 Clarifying Orthodoxy and My Denial
The orthodoxy that is rooted in Quine and continued in Lewis is not a view that is
frequently explicitly revisited, argued for, explained, etc. It is a kind of tacit orthodoxy
of assumption, accepted by ontologists as a default view. It is not accepted by all
ontologists—people like Graham Priest in the Meinongian tradition fight against this
orthodox view. I’ll discuss Priest more shortly, but for now, I will briefly summarize
orthodoxy in general.
This summary will be brief, since David Lewis gives us a clear statement of the
orthodoxy I’m denying. I’ve included this passage before, but I repeat it here to aid in
clarity:
Routley sees himself as defying an established orthodoxy; and I am prepared
to appoint myself spokesman for the orthodoxy he defies. [. . . ] We of the
establishment think that there is only one kind of quantification. The several
idioms of what we call ‘existential’ quantification are entirely synonymous
and interchangeable. It does not matter whether you say ‘Some things are
donkeys’ or ‘There are donkeys’ or ‘Donkeys exist’—you mean exactly the
same thing whichever way you say it.12
12 Lewis [30], pp. 24–25
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This passage contains two primary points that, taken together, constitute the orthodox
view. Altering them slightly from Lewis’s wording, we get the following:
Orthodox View of Existential Quantifier Expressions:
(O1) There is only one kind of existential quantification.
(O2) Existential quantifier expressions are synonymous and interchangeable.
The first of these, (O1), matches roughly with the tenet of Quinian metaontology that
van Inwagen expressed as “being is univocal”, while (O2) matches (closely enough)
the tenet expressed as “being is the same as existence”.13 Assuming these links are
reasonable enough, then it’s easy to see why we should be comfortable calling this the
orthodox view of existential quantifier expressions. It is explicitly endorsed as such by
Lewis, and it also matches up with the view endorsed by Quine and van Inwagen.
These three philosophers have clearly shaped the field of analytic metaphysics more
than most others in the past six decades. Quine’s papers discussed above reinvigo-
rated metaphysics in the mid-20th century, and Lewis’s On the Plurality of Worlds and
van Inwagen’s Material Beings were two of the biggest shapers of the conversations in
metaphysics in the latter part of the 20th century into the present. We can add to
this list Ted Sider, saying in his influential book Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of
Persistence and Time:
What could it mean to say that there is a single correct meaning for ‘∃’ (be-
yond the triviality that just one meaning is mine)? This is a serious question
for anyone who takes ontology seriously. I will answer by sketching a picture
according to which there is a single privileged meaning for (unrestricted)
quantificational expressions.14
Here Sider clearly aligns himself with the orthodox view, capturing (O1) and (O2)
together in one breath by claiming that there is, “a single correct meaning for ‘∃’.”
13 It may be worried here that Quine’s stance on synonymy prevents this match. If Quine does not
believe there is a synonymy relation, as we can reasonably interpret him saying in Quine [37], then
he would not agree that quantifier expressions like ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ are synonymous. My
response is: that’s just fine. Quine clearly thinks it’s acceptable to interchange the expressions without
any substantive loss or alteration in meaning. That is close enough. If he backs off even further from
the interchangeability claim, then he begins to agree more with me and less with Lewis and others.
That would also be acceptable—I’d be happy to have Quine on my side.
14 Sider [42], p. xv.
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The purpose of pointing out the stance as well as the relative influence of Quine,
Lewis, van Inwagen, and Sider is to support the notion that this view expressed in (O1)
and (O2) really is the orthodox, received view in metaphysics about the meaning of
existential quantifier expressions. There are certainly unorthodox views out there, but
with proponents like these, it is reasonable to say that this view is the primary or default
view. And since it is the orthodox view, it gives us even more motivation to point out
where it goes wrong, if indeed it does.
In response to the orthodox view, I have offered a contextualist view of ‘there is’,
and I maintain that ‘there exists’ is invariant in its meaning. The last three chapters
have been developing these two claims, and they can be summarized in the following
way to see the contrast with the orthodox view:
Anti-Orthodox View of Existential Quantifier Expressions:
(A1) ‘There is’ is a context-sensitive expression.
(A2) ‘There exists’ is invariant in meaning.
These two claims, taken together, amount to a denial of (O2), since an invariant ex-
pression and a context-sensitive expression, no matter how similar, cannot be entirely
synonymous or interchangeable. And though I do not claim that there are different
kinds of quantification in any robust sense, I disagree with (O1) insofar as it is offered
in support of a view that there is one fixed meaning for all of the existential quantifier
expressions. My claim of (A1) denies this, as do other views that claim existential
quantifier expressions to be ambiguous.
In what follows, I will now do some holistic comparison between the orthodox view
and my own contextualist view, determining how they fare relative to one another on
the kinds of desiderata we would like satisfied by a view about the meaning of existential
quantifier expressions.
4.4 Comparing Anti-Orthodoxy with Orthodoxy
What is it we really want out of a view about the meaning of ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’?
Ideally, we would like the view to be compatible with most pre-theoretic intuitions we
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have, while also providing elegant explanations of their semantics. We want a view to
rest on the weakest, least-controversial assumptions possible.
My dissatisfaction with the orthodox view is that its proponents must explain away
some of the data that I take to be the most important data for understanding the
meaning of existential quantifier expressions. Much of this data is about how we use
the expressions, both in ordinary and in philosophical settings. Words like ‘is’ and
‘exists’ are not technical terms—they are extremely basic expressions that lie at the
core of the language, and any competent speaker must be able to use these expressions
properly with ease. So focusing on the way these expressions actually get used is crucial
to filling out a theory of their meaning.
In what follows, I’ll discuss some points of comparison between the orthodox view
and my own. This will be a sort of scorekeeping exercise, since we will be discussing
where each theory has its strengths and weaknesses. The claim I intend to establish here
in this chapter is that, on balance, my unorthodox view fares better than the orthodox
view. I will only be viewing these theories through the lenses of a small number of
possible comparison points, but my goal is to choose the most relevant and illuminating
comparisons. In the sections that follow, I will take up various desiderata in turn. These
are:
1. Agreement With Usage—the correct view should account for obvious differences
in how we use ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’
2. Agreement With Intentions—the correct view should provide an explanation that
fits with what we intend to say when we use these expressions
3. Ontological Neutrality—the correct view about the meaning of these expressions
should remain as neutral as possible about ontological matters
4. Simplicity—the correct view should be as simple as possible, avoiding needless
complexity
With each of these, I’ll explain them and discuss the approaches available to orthodoxy
and contextualism, comparing them as I go. At the end, I’ll summarize why I see
contextualism as coming out on top in this comparison.
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4.4.1 Agreement With Usage
The issue of the usage of existential quantifier expressions was taken up in Chapter 1,
exploring the notion of ontological robustness. I revisit it here now that my view and
the orthodox view have been more clearly developed, and we can say what each view
can offer as an explanation of usage.
It’s clear that we use ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ differently. We rarely use ‘there
exists’ in ordinary settings. When we do, the ‘exists’ generally appears to be present
for the purpose of emphasis, such as emphasizing the stark reality of something, or the
discovery of life somewhere, or something we may not expect to exist. We use ‘there
is’ much more routinely, and the expression generally takes a backseat to the subject
matter at hand, whether it’s superheroes, swans, or anything else. But we certainly can
use ‘there is’ more like ‘there exists’, emphasizing existence or subsistence or things like
that. Sometimes we do that with verbal emphasis, sometimes by adding other modifying
words like ‘really’, or sometimes just by letting the context make it clear what we’re
saying.
Anti-orthodoxy—my view that is a combination of (A1) and (A2) above—offers a
relatively straightforward explanation of the variance in our usage of these expressions.
If ‘there exists’ is invariant in meaning, associated explicitly with the domain of objects
that exist, it makes sense that we will use it infrequently, saving it for those times when
we actually want to accentuate existence. The variance we see in our usage of ‘there
is’ can be explained quite well with the contextualist view I’ve offered. This variance
was actually a primary motivation for the view in the first place, so this shouldn’t be a
surprise. Sometimes when we use ‘there is’, we’re intending to quantify over nonexistent
objects, and other times when we use it, we’re in the middle of an ontological dispute.
Recognizing this expression as context-sensitive allows us to see why this makes sense,
why we can be competent speakers of English and still use ‘there is’ as a quantifier,
regardless of whether we believe in the existence of the things we’re purporting to
quantify over.
The orthodox view, on the other hand, cannot explain the variance in ‘there is’
as straightforwardly. If ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ are entirely synonymous and inter-
changeable, then we should be able to interchange them without altering the meaning of
our claims in any situation, especially in flat-out assertions of quantified claims (leaving
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aside any concerns about what happens when they are embedded inside belief reports
and such things). The examples discussed in Chapter 1 show that we clearly cannot
interchange these expressions in all normal situations.
My primary example throughout the previous chapters has been a sentence about
superheroes. This is clearly a case where we cannot plug in ‘there exists’ for ‘there is’,
since part of the example is that the speaker does not believe that superheroes exist. I
use this example because discourse about fiction gives us the clearest case of a situation
where we have beliefs that these objects don’t exist, but we try to quantify over them
anyway.
Some may worry that I’m ignoring an entire literature about fictional discourse and
the ontology of fiction. I am not ignoring it, but I have been bracketing it. There
are puzzles about fictional discourse and views designed to solve those puzzles that are
certainly relevant to the issues I’m interested in, but it’s not clear that they help the
orthodox view in the discussion at hand. For example, one way to deal with quantified
claims about fictional characters is to adopt the view that that these quantified claims
are really elliptical for ‘in the fiction’ claims. That is, when Nick says, “There are
superheroes who are animals but also people,” he is really saying, “In the fiction, there
are superheroes who are animals but also people.” Or, instead of ‘the fiction’, the
operator may be more specific, depending on what Nick is talking about. It may be ‘in
the Marvel universe’ or ‘in comic books’.
This ellipses explanation only works for object-fictional claims, or those that are the
kinds of claims that may make it sound like we’re pretending the fictional characters
are real. Aside from the fact that there are complicated object-fictional claims that
don’t lend themselves well to a single ‘in the fiction’-style operator (like those that cross
fictions or genres in one single claim), there are also meta-fictional claims to deal with.
These are claims that sound more like they belong in the realm of literary criticism,
where speakers talk about fictional characters in a way that recognizes their fictional
(or nonexistent) status. Nick’s claim may even be read as a meta-fictional claim, since
he is speaking more to fact that we may find characters of a certain sort if we look in
comic books, while at the same time pointing out that they don’t exist.
The problem here is that views like this elliptical one do not help explain why there
is a clear difference between using ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ in our quantified claims.
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They do not make it any more likely that we will use ‘there exists’ when we’re purporting
to quantify over things that we clearly do not believe exist. All this kind of view does
is address the issue of why we may be happy to say such things in the first place, which
is an issue my view comfortably explains as well.
Now, the proponent of orthodoxy may appeal instead to pragmatics to explain why
we may choose ‘there is’ over ‘there exists’. A potential view would be to say that ‘there
is’ and ‘there exists’ are synonymous, but they have some different associations external
to their content that lead us to use one over the other. This view would be coherent, and
it may say some things that are very similar to the account I’ve given of how ‘there is’
and ‘there exists’ differ, just placing these differences at the level of pragmatics instead
of semantics. It may say that since the word ‘exists’ appears in ‘there exists’, people
may choose not to use that since they know it may draw the listeners’ attention to
existence more than they might like.
There are two problems with this line—one is that it gives up on the notion that
‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ are interchangeable, as Lewis maintained, and the other is
that it must say something even less palatable about the truth of the claims than my
own view does. I maintained that a claim like Nick’s expresses a gappy proposition that
is neither true nor false. The orthodox view must maintain here that Nick’s claim is false
(at least if taken to be meta-fictional). This seems worse than having no truth-value,
when we’re discussing a claim that the speaker himself thinks is true.
4.4.2 Agreement With Our Intentions
In Chapter 3, we discussed the intentions of the speaker and the role they play in the
contextualist theory of ‘is’. On this demonstrative view, intentions play an important
meta-semantic role in fixing the meaning of the quantifier expression. Whether my
particular view is correct or not, it seems clear that we do actually have the kinds of
intentions I discussed, i.e., the intention to quantify over nonexistent objects. There are
clearly times where we expressly believe that certain objects don’t exist, yet we are still
happy to quantify over them using ‘there is’, but not ‘there exists’.
It may be obvious, but I’ll just point out the difference between this desideratum
and the previous one. The point about usage has to do with how we actually use
expressions like ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’—what we actually say and what we consider
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to be acceptable or felicitous usage of them. The point at hand is about our intentions,
so it is about our mental states or about what we want or hope to express during a
conversation. The previous desideratum can be satisfied by a theory that adequately
explains our usage, giving an account that fits with and makes sense of how we talk.
This desideratum about intentions can be satisfied by a theory that adequately explains
the fit between our language and our intentions—that is, what our language says about
our intentions, and why we say what we do, given what we intend.
Both views clearly get most of what we want with respect to our intentions—when
we use ‘there is’ or ‘there exists’, we intend to quantify over some objects. We intend to
do what quantifiers allow us to do, described in detail in Chapter 2, when we discussed
truth conditions and semantics. But the main part where orthodoxy and anti-orthodoxy
diverge is when it comes to accounting for our intention to say something true when we
assert existentially quantified claims.
Now, it’s part of my view that speakers who purport to quantify over objects that
they themselves believe to be nonexistent are making a certain kind of mistake. They
intend to quantify over nonexistent objects, and they are unsuccessful, since there aren’t
any nonexistent objects. Quine’s own criterion of ontological commitment can help us
see that they must have such an intention and that they are making a mistake—if
pressed on his assertion and invited to be careful about ontological commitments, a
speaker like Nick will likely retract his claim, realizing that he wasn’t entirely successful
in what he intended to do. I say ‘entirely’, because he was successful in communicating
what he wanted to communicate to his daughter Mirah. He failed to say something
true, but he did say something meaningful, and he would say the same thing again in a
similar conversation.
The fact that I’m attributing a mistake to ordinary speakers in this situation may
seem like it works against my view, but it should be noted that orthodoxy must say
something similar, and even less appetizing. If the problem stems from the fact that
ordinary speakers intend to quantify over nonexistent objects, then the proponent of
orthodoxy will also need to attribute an error to ordinary speakers. The error will be
different—instead of the speakers expressing a gappy proposition (as they do on my
view), they would be expressing a proposition that includes the one true existential
quantifier meaning, whose unrestricted domain is just those objects that exist. So
88
instead of being truth-value-less, as the claims are on my view, they would be false on
the orthodox view.
Now, the same machinery is available to both the orthodox and the anti-orthodox
view to deal with this problem. The proponent of orthodoxy need not appeal to lin-
guistic meaning in order to explain why we feel something meaningful is said—there
is a complete proposition expressed on this view. But that proposition is false, so the
proponent of orthodoxy will need to address that issue instead. It may be maintained
that some other proposition is pragmatically conveyed, and this other proposition is
true, so this satisfies our intention to say something true. This route is open to both
the orthodox and the anti-orthodox view, so it is a bit of a wash.
I think that both sides are on relatively equal footing when it comes to dealing with
the problem of speakers making a mistake in the way described here. The primary
difference is that my view has speakers expressing gappy propositions without truth
values, while the orthodox view has speakers expressing complete, false propositions. I
take this to be a slight advantage for my view, since the mistake of expressing a gappy
proposition is slightly more understandable than the mistake of expressing a false one.
This is certainly debatable, and it may depend on each individual case of a mistake,
but I am more comfortable saying that Nick’s mistake at the content level is that the
proposition doesn’t end up being complete in the way that it should have, rather than
saying that the proposition expressed is something he could easily have said if he’d
wanted to, but chose not to. He could have easily said, “There exist superheroes who
are animals but also people,” expressing a proposition that he himself believes to be
false. But he chose to make use of ‘there is’ in all likelihood because he wanted to
say something different than the false proposition—he didn’t realize that he couldn’t
actually express the proposition he wanted to, but this mistake fits better with the result
of having a gappy proposition be the result, rather than a familiar false proposition.
4.4.3 Ontological Neutrality
Another desideratum we ought to have for any view about the meaning of existential
quantifier expressions is that the view remains as neutral as possible about the matter
of ontology. Just as a view about names should not force us to have to say whether
Sherlock Holmes exists or not and a view about demonstratives should not force a view
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about the existence of ‘that polar bear in the corner’, a view about ‘there is’ and ‘there
exists’ should not say anything controversial about the existence of objects that may
purport to be the subject matter of quantified claims. It’s important to remember that
orthodoxy and anti-orthodoxy are views that fall in the realm of metaontology, not
ontology itself.
The main ontological dispute that seems relevant here is the issue of whether our
ontologies may contain nonexistent objects or not. It can be a complicated matter to
separate the ontological from the metaontological question here, but it seems useful to
do so. The ontological question is something like, “Are there nonexistent objects?” or,
“Does the correct accounting of the objects of the world include nonexistent objects?”
The metaontological question I concern myself with here is rather, “Is there a difference
in meaning between the expressions ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’. and if so, what is it?”
Now, it may be difficult to take up one of these questions without also thereby taking
up the other, but I have attempted to do so here. And I claim that it is a virtue of
a view about the metaontological question that it remains as neutral as possible on
the ontological question. The dispute between the Quinian and the Meinongian over
nonexistent objects seems to be a substantive one that ought not to be decided by a
view about the meaning of existential quantifier expressions.
How do the two views at hand fare on this matter? I do see a slight advantage to
anti-orthodoxy on this issue. The reason is that, since anti-orthodoxy heavily respects
our usage, making sense of the way we attempt to quantify about nonexistent objects,
it easily adapts to any kind of ontological view a bit more easily. Specifically, this view
could be useful for a Meinongian who wants to make a distinction between existence
and being, claiming perhaps that some objects have the property of being but lack the
property of existence. I do not claim this kind of ontological view for my own, but I
consider it a virtue of my anti-orthodox view of existential quantifier expressions that
it does not obviously favor one view over another. Even though my ontological leanings
are more in line with Quine’s than the Meinongian’s, I am not so confident in them that
I would be comfortable with the orthodox view of existential quantifier expressions.
The orthodox view is not entirely unfriendly to alternative ontologies, but it is not
exactly conducive to them either. It would be much more difficult to distinguish between
two properties of existence and being while also maintaining that ‘there exists’ and ‘there
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is’ are entirely synonymous. It may be more directly important for this issue where we
stand on the meaning of the predicates ‘x exists’ and ‘x has being’, an issue which I am
not taking up here, but these predicates and the properties they denote will clearly be
related in some way to the associated quantifier expressions.
On other matters of ontology aside from the issue of Meinongianism, the orthodox
view seems unproblematic, or at least on equal footing with my anti-orthodox view.
Claiming that ‘there exists’ means the same as ‘there is’ does not have any specific
consequences about whether, say, numbers exist, or other similar controversial issues in
ontology. In fact, when it comes to most ontological discussions, my anti-orthodox view
will end up saying virtually the same thing as the orthodox view, since it is part of my
view that, since ‘there is’ is context-sensitive, if we are in a context where we’re explicitly
talking about existence, ‘there is’ takes on the same meaning as ‘there exists’.15
4.4.4 Semantic Simplicity
The final desideratum I’ll discuss here on its own is the notion of semantic simplicity,
which is just the idea that it is a virtue of a theory of meaning, even of a specific small
group of words, that the theory avoid needless complication and attempt to give the
simplest explanation possible. Of course there is no desire to over-simplify a theory—it
is understandable that semantics may sometimes be complex and difficult. But if we’re
comparing two theories and one of them seems overly complex compared to the other,
we may have a reason to prefer the simpler theory.
By this standard, the orthodox view appears to have an edge over anti-orthodoxy. An
invariance view is always semantically simpler than a context-sensitive view—the word
just means one thing across all contexts, without the extra semantic machinery required
for context-sensitivity. There is no need to try make sense of where the contextual index
might go, or what features of the context are important for fixing the content of the
expression. There is also no need to worry about whether the expression operates more
like an indexical, with a fixed character, or a demonstrative that requires some kind of
(physical or mental) pointing.
15 This would make it difficult, though not impossible, for the Meinongians to have a conversation
about which objects exist and which just have being—but they themselves would likely recognize this
difficulty. It’s hard for anyone to talk about nonexistent objects, once it has become explicit that you’re
intentionally talking about nonexistent objects and their ontological status.
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If our only desideratum were semantic simplicity, I would be a proponent of the
orthodox view of existential quantifier expressions. But it is important to look at more
than just this feature. There’s no good reason to expect semantics to be simple—
simplicity really only gives us a reason to support one view over another when all else is
equal, or at least very close to being equal. I won’t claim that my reasons for believing
that ‘there is’ is context-sensitive are on equal footing with the reasons for believing,
say, that ‘I’ is context-sensitive rather than invariant. But it is good to notice that we
do accept a great deal of complexity in semantics, when that complexity seems to be
moving us towards the correct view.
4.4.5 Summing up the Desiderata
The above sections have detailed how I see the comparison between the orthodox view of
existential quantifier expressions and my own anti-orthodoxy. On balance, I think that
the only desideratum that really favors the orthodox view is that of semantic simplicity,
and that is simply not enough, in the face of other features that are important to such
a theory. The orthodox view does not give a good enough explanation of our usage
of these expressions, and it does not give a good accounting of what our intentions
are when we use them. Furthermore, it is not quite as ontologically neutral as the
anti-orthodox view I’ve presented.
The orthodox view has remained orthodox largely, I believe, because of an absence
of acceptable competitors. The primary competitors to orthodoxy generally come from
philosophers who are committed to a Meinongian ontology, such as Richard Routley,
Terence Parsons, Edward Zalta, and Graham Priest. Their ontological views appear to
be primary, and the denial of the orthodox view of existential quantifier expressions then
sounds like a patch to make their ontology more palatable. My own view is motivated
solely by the desire to understand the meaning of the words ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’
better.
It is also worth pointing out that the orthodox view has only been orthodox (at least
in the form discussed above) since Quine’s work reinvigorated metaphysics. Graham
Priest [35] points out that historically, it has been quite common to distinguish ter-
minologically between different existential quantifier expressions, some with ontological
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thickness and some without. He points out that Aristotle used what is generally trans-
lated as ‘some’ rather than anything with explicit existential reference when making
claims that we would use an existential quantifier for. And this, combined with the fact
that Aristotle was comfortable with reference to non-existent objects,16 seems to show
at least that Aristotle did not explicitly associate existence with cases of existential
quantification.
Priest points out other historical examples from Medieval logicians such as Buridan
and Paul of Venice,17 and then he points out how some 19th century logicians such
as Keynes and Venn brought the word ‘existence’ explicitly into logical discussions but
explicitly removed ontological significance from it, using it just as a shorthand way
to discuss what’s in a domain of discourse.18 Priest then blames Peirce and Frege
for introducing (independently of each other) the existentially loaded quantifier into
logic,19 and he gives an extensive discussion of how Russell went about perpetuating
and defending (rather poorly, in Priest’s view) this existential loading.20
The background discussed by Priest gives us a picture of how these expressions have
been treated in the area of logic, by logicians, but it is useful for establishing that there
is nothing particularly sacred about the meaning of existential quantifier expressions.
The intentional ‘unloading’ of ontological significance of the word ‘existence’ by Keynes
and Venn that Priest mentions appears to be a clearly technical usage of the word.
When it suits our purposes, we may stipulate whatever kinds of meanings we like for
these expressions—if it helps draw attention do domains for a discussion in logic, there’s
nothing wrong with unloading ‘existence’ in that setting. But it’s good to be clear that
this is a technical stipulation, diverging from the meaning of the word.
Although the historical comments of Priest’s are interesting, and they keep us in
perspective when thinking about how orthodox the orthodox view is, it is also important
to point out that my anti-orthodox view is not intended as an historically-centered view.
I’m not relying on etymology or historical usage to make my case—this is a look at what
16 Priest points out that in the Posterior Analytic, Aristotle says, “. . . one can signify even things
that are not” (An. Post 92b 29-30).)
17 Priest [35], p. 45. See also Priest [34], section 3.7.1, for more discussion of Medieval logicians and
nonexistence.
18 Priest [35], pp. 46–47
19 Priest [35], p. 47
20 Priest [35], pp. 48–51
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these words mean now, regardless of their evolution. I do think it’s important to see that
as long as we’ve had fiction and make-believe and ontological confusion we’ve needed
to have devices in our language for talking about them and purporting to quantify over
them. Those devices may change over time, but it seems clear that right now, we have
the flexible expression ‘there is’, which we can use for quantified claims whether we care
about the existence of the objects we’re trying to quantify over or not. And we reserve
‘there exists’ for those cases where we’re comfortable with the ontological commitment
that comes along with it.
Chapter 5
Concluding and Tying Up Loose
Ends
5.1 Introduction
In this final chapter, I will conclude by tying up a few loose ends. One point that I
have not discussed outside of a few brief remarks is the context-sensitivity of the word
‘knows’. It will be helpful if I make a few remarks here about some connections we might
see between that contextualist view and my own—this will also extend my argument for
my view as well, since these comments will show that some objections to contextualism
about ‘knows’ do not apply in the case of ‘there is’. Another loose end that deserves
some remark is the issue of other kinds of unorthodox views about the meaning of
existential quantifier expressions. I have mentioned some in passing, but I have not
discussed them thoroughly. There are ambiguity views such as Thomas Hofweber’s and
Timothy Williamson’s, and there is Priest’s anti-synonymy view. I’ll discuss these in
enough detail here to see where they fit in and what we can say about them, in light of
the previous four chapters.
5.2 Contrast With Epistemic Contextualism
Contextualism about ‘knows’, or epistemic contextualism, is a plausible view and an
elegant approach to some puzzles about knowledge and our knowledge ascriptions. It
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has plenty of proponents and detractors, and I’m not going to take a stance on it one
way or another. Rather, I’ll discuss epistemic contextualism just enough to explore
connections we might see between it and my own contextualist view about ‘there is’.
The three primary models of contextualism about ‘knows’ appear to be the following:
David Lewis’s view, found in his “Elusive Knowledge” [31]; Stewart Cohen’s treatment
in such papers as “Knowledge and Context” [9] and “Knowledge, Context, and Social
Standards” [10]; and Keith DeRose’s view, collected recently in his A Case for Con-
textualism [16].1 I’ll focus on Cohen’s view, since that is the one I’m most familiar
with.
The basic idea of Cohen’s contextualism about ‘knows’ is that the truth of our
knowledge attributions—sentences like “S knows that p”—depends on the epistemic
standards of the speaker, which include such things as the information that is currently
salient to the speaker at the time of utterance. Cohen gives some details of the view,
illustrating it with an example in the following passage:
A common thread in contextualist theories is that the salience of error pos-
sibilities raises the standards for how strong one’s epistemic position has to
be in order for one to know. Contextualism resolves the sceptical paradox
by construing our apparently inconsistent intuitions as resulting from con-
textual shifts in these standards. So, for example, our intuition that the
sentence ‘Smith knows his car is parked in lot 2’ is true is explained by the
fact that at ordinary contexts, the statement is in fact true. Our apparently
conflicting intuition that the sentence ‘Smith does not know his car has not
been stolen’ is false results from our shifting to a stricter context when we
consider the possibility that Smith’s car has been stolen. At this new con-
text, the sentence is indeed false. But deductive closure for knowledge is
preserved relative to a context. So at everyday contexts, both ‘Smith knows
his car is parked in lot 2’ and ‘Smith knows his car has not been stolen’ are
true. At stricter contexts, neither sentence is true.2
1 There is much more to the field and the history of Contextualism than these three figures, but
they are quite central. Among other things, DeRose’s book contains a nice history of Contextualism
and survey of the different views.
2 Cohen [14], p. 200.
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As we see here, one of the features of a contextualist view about ‘knows’ is that it can
give us a way to approach, and hopefully solve, some paradoxical cases. How can Smith
know where his car is parked when, if we asked him if he knows his car has not been
stolen, he would say, “No”? Answer: by bringing up the possibility of cars being stolen,
we’re making that possibility salient, and this changes the epistemic standards, thereby
changing the truth-value of knowledge attributions.
The truth-value changes from context to context on this view because the knowledge
relation that appears at the level of content is sensitive to the epistemic standards of
the speaker. John Hawthorne gives a brief and relatively neutral characterization of the
semantics of epistemic contextualism here:
[I]t is helpful to think of the extension of ‘know’ on some particular occa-
sion of use as a set of subject–proposition–time triples. According to the
contextualist, then, the extension of some tokening of ‘know’ may include
some particular triple that does not belong to the extension of some other
tokening.3
So with Cohen’s example above, we might say that the proposition expressed by ‘Smith
knows his car is parked in lot 2’ will have Smith himself in it, the proposition that
Smith’s car is parked in lot 2, and a set of triples that is the content of ‘knows’. If that
set of triples contains the Smith–p–t, where ‘p’ is the proposition that Smith’s car is
parked in lot 2 and ‘t ’ is the time of utterance of the entire sentence, is a member of
that set of triples, then the sentence is true. But if the triple is not there, it’s false.
What decides whether that triple is in the set or not will be the epistemic standards in
the context, such as what is salient to the speaker.
Unlike epistemic contextualism, on my view, the content of the expression is depen-
dent on the intentions of the speaker (the intended domain), not what is salient to the
speaker. This difference is important because it allows me to avoid one problem that a
contextualist view like Cohen’s faces, viz. the problem of switching contexts. Since a
crucial factor in determining epistemic standards, on Cohen’s view, is what is salient to
the speaker, there is a problem insofar as it is quite difficult, once something has become
salient, to make it un-salient. That is, once a speaker begins to worry about whether
3 Hawthorne [17], p. 58.
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her car has been stolen, she cannot just easily put that worry to the side. She may
relax and not feel over-anxious about it, but it will still be salient in a significant sense.
This makes it very difficult to speak in one context about what we say in other contexts
without doing a good deal of quoting and being careful about use-mention issues.
On my view, talking about different ways we may have meant our expression or our
assertion is just a matter of making clear what our intentions were, or might be. Even
if the context has been altered from one where we intend to quantify over nonexistent
objects to one where we are explicitly concerned with ontology, or what exists, we can
still shift back to ordinary contexts with relative easy. We can say things like, “Okay,
enough ontology, let’s go back to talking about comic books like normal people.” This
makes our shift in intentions clear, and our content follows along obediently. This would
not be so easy if the content was indexed to what is salient to us, since it is reasonable
to think that the ontological discussion and the worries about existence would still be
salient in some sense after just completing a discussion about them.
Another issue that is raised as a problem for epistemic contextualism that will be
worth discussing here is that of the model of context-sensitivity chosen. Cohen’s view
is that the indexical model is the correct one for ‘knows’,4 and this appears to be the
prevailing notion. My own contextualist view about ‘there is’ chooses the demonstrative
model rather than the indexical one. What difference does this make? It may make
several differences, but one that I will focus on briefly here is the fact that both kinds
of contextualism will have error-theoretic components, and the model chosen may make
a difference with respect to this.
I’ve discussed the error-theoretic aspects of my own view in previous chapters, noting
that I am committed to saying that speakers make an error if they think they are
asserting something true when they attempt to quantify over nonexistent objects. On
Cohen’s view, the error a speaker is making is of a different kind. His view is designed
to show how speakers may be speaking truly from context to context, even if they
assert p in one context and not-p in another. That is, I may truly say, “Smith knows
where his car is parked,” in a low-standard context and then, while worrying about
car theft a few minutes later, may truly say, “Smith does not know where his car is
4 In Cohen [11], for example, he says, “[T]he theory I wish to defend construes ‘knowledge’ as an
indexical,” p. 97.
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parked.” The error that epistemic contextualism is committed to, then, is not in the
truth-value of our claims. Rather, it is an error that comes about when we look at these
two different claims, uttered in different contexts, and think that they are inconsistent
claims. They are not really inconsistent, since the first was true in the context in which
it was uttered, and the second was true in its own context. Cohen’s treatment of this is
just to point out that the invariantist about ‘knows’ is on no better footing, since it is
just as problematic—or perhaps moreso—to deny the consistency of these claims and
have to say that the speaker errs by thinking that these claims are both true.5
Cohen’s response seems just fine, so I am not going to say there’s a difference in that
his view can’t handle the error-theoretic consequence and mine can. The only point I
want to make with this comparison is that we might think that a demonstrative view
lends itself a bit more to the expectation of an error than an indexical view. The prime
difference between indexicals and demonstratives is that indexicals are governed by a
fixed character, a semantic rule that leads from the context of utterance to a content,
while demonstratives are governed by a pointing in the context (a mental pointing,
on my view). When it come to speakers making errors, then, we might note that it is
generally more difficult to become confused about indexicals than about demonstratives.
If I’m a competent speaker of English, I’ll understand the rule that governs words like
‘I’ and ‘today’ in a way that prevents me from making errors about the content of them.
But when pointing is involved, whether it’s physical or mental, I may understand how
‘that’ works perfectly well and still mess up when I make or interpret a demonstration.
Cohen’s treatment of the error theoretic aspect of his view handles this issue, since
the error he accepts is not one at the level of content, but rather at the level of noticing
the consistency of two different claims, uttered in different contexts. So this error is
more like someone thinking that the claims, “Today is cold,” and, “Today is not cold,”
are inconsistent until it is pointed out that they were uttered on two different days. My
point here, though, is that with a demonstrative model, an error theoretic aspect of the
view should be more comfortable, more expected even, then with an indexical model.
Indexicals have more semantic information, in a sense, that competent speakers are
expected to know, so if something goes wrong, the error may seem a bit more serious.
5 See Cohen [13], p. 70.
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5.3 Some Other Unorthodox Views
Now I’d like to switch topics to another loose end that is worth tying up—the dis-
cussion of a few other anti-orthodox views about the meaning of existential quantifier
expressions. Recall that there were two primary tenets of the orthodox view:
Orthodox View of Existential Quantifier Expressions:
(O1) There is only one kind of existential quantification.
(O2) Existential quantifier expressions are synonymous and interchangeable.
And my own denial of the orthodox view had two primary tenets of its own:
Anti-Orthodox View of Existential Quantifier Expressions:
(A1) ‘There is’ is a context-sensitive expression.
(A2) ‘There exists’ is invariant in meaning.
In effect, I deny both (O1) and (O2), since I see ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ as having
significantly different meanings, the former being context-sensitive and the latter being
invariant.
Other views, proposed by philosophers like Thomas Hofweber and Graham Priest,
deny the tenets of the orthodox view in different ways than my own denial. Hofwe-
ber’s view is that existential quantifier expressions are ambiguous, denying (O1), while
not taking issue with (O2), since he does not propose a distinction between different
existential quantifier expressions. Priest takes a different route, denying (O2) by dis-
tinguishing between different existential quantifier expressions in their meaning, though
it’s unclear whether he should be taken as denying (O1) or not. I’ll focus on these two
views, since they seem interesting and relevant, though they are certainly not the only
anti-orthodox views out there.
5.3.1 Hofweber’s Ambiguity View
Thomas Hofweber’s view is that existential quantifier expressions are ambiguous be-
tween two readings. The ‘domain-conditions’ reading is the one I’ve discussed, giving
the traditional semantics for it in Chapter 2, while the ‘inferential role’ reading is more
like substitutional quantification. Hofweber explains this in the following passage:
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Beside the domain-conditions reading, quantifiers also have an inferential
role reading, or also internal reading. In this reading sentences with quan-
tifiers are inferentially related to sentences without such quantifiers (in the
simplest case). For example, the quantifier ‘something’ in this reading has
the inferential role that ‘Something is F’ follows from each instance of ‘F(t)’,
for any term ‘t’ in the language. I have argued in [Hofweber [19]] that we
do have a need in ordinary communication to have an expression that plays
exactly this role. This need has nothing to do with metaphysics but rather
with a need to communicate information in a situation of partial ignorance.
But in a language like ours, where not every term denotes an object in the
domain of discourse, and not every object is denoted by a term, no single
contribution to the truth conditions can yield both a domain condition and
an inferential role. In the limit, when every term denotes an object and ev-
ery object is denoted by a term, these two can coincide, but in our language
they do not.6
Hofweber is motivated by similar concerns as mine—we clearly need a device in our
language for at least purporting to quantify over nonexistent objects. He just takes
a different route, ending up by saying that sometimes when we quantify we mean it
in the normal, ontologically-committing way, but other times we mean it just in a
substitutional way. The substitutional way is non-ontologically-committing, since it is
just focused on the inferential role of the quantifier, not what is in the domain.
Now, the issue of the sensibility of substitutional quantification is interesting in its
own right. It may be difficult to separate off the domain from the quantifier, say that
it’s unimportant on these uses, and still make sense of the claim being a quantified
claim.7 My own primary reason for not finding an ambiguity view acceptable is the
difficulty we have with using a quantifier expression in two different ways within a single
sentence. We cannot say, for example, “There are superheroes who can fly, but there
aren’t any.” If ‘there is’ were ambiguous, we should be able to say this in a way that we
could, once we’re paying attention, hear as an acceptable sentence, making use of two
6 Hofweber [21], p. 28
7 See, for example, Peter van Inwagen [45] for a discussion of his worries about substitutional
quantification.
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different senses of the quantifier expression. I don’t think that works, and I also think
that my own contextualist view captures the phenomena that motivate both Hofweber
and I in a better way than his ambiguity view.
Hofweber also makes some other comments that lend support to my overall approach
as well as to his, while discussing the role of ‘there exists’ as opposed to other quantifier
expressions. He points out that the Meinongian position treats ‘exists’ as a contextual
restriction on other quantifiers, in the way that ‘who owns a scooter’ restricts ‘everyone’
in the claim, “Everyone who owns a scooter likes to watch Battlestar Galactica.” Hofwe-
ber thinks the intuition behind looking at ‘exists’ as a restrictor like this is a strong
intuition, and a problem for the Quinian. He takes himself to have a non-Meinongian
explanation of this intuition (as I take myself to have as well). Since he thinks that there
are two readings of quantifier expressions, a claim with an expression like ‘something’
is sometimes underspecified, on his view. If I just say, “Something makes me happy,”
that on its own is underspecified, whether to read ‘something’ in the internal (inferential
role) or the external (domain conditions) way. It could be that Thor makes me happy,
and Thor doesn’t exist, making it more appropriate to read my claim in the inferential
role way. With this in mind, Hofweber claims that ‘exists’ is a specifier, i.e., an indicator
as to which reading of the quantifier we should use. He says, “The difference between
‘something’ and ‘something, which exists’ is that the latter forces that the quantifier is
used in its external [domain conditions] use.”8
I don’t know if I would put this quite as Hofweber does, saying that the intuition that
‘exists’ is a restrictor is a strong one. But I do agree that something along these lines is
correct, and the Meinongian kind of intuitions do need to be accounted for. I think my
own view offers quite a bit better of an explanation of this phenomenon than Hofweber’s,
since he is in a position where he has to say that the word ‘exists’ pushes us towards
one of the two the meanings of existential quantifier expressions, even though he’s not
actually making a distinction in meaning between the different existential quantifier
expressions ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’. On my view, which argues for a difference in
meaning between them, it makes much more sense why the word ‘exists’ would have an
effect on our conversation. First of all, it is associated invariantly with the domain of
existing objects. Secondly, it is the kind of word that, when brought into a conversation,
8 Hofweber [19], p. 271
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has the power to shift the conversation from a context where existence was not important
to one in which it now is. If we were using ‘there is’ before, talking about superheroes
to our kids, once someone brings up existence, the conversation can easily shift in an
important way. And if we have a feeling that there’s been a restriction of the domain,
it’s because we were intending to quantify over nonexistent objects before, and now our
intentions have shifted to just the domain of existing objects.9
5.3.2 Graham Priest’s Denial of Synonymy
A different kind of anti-orthodox view comes from Graham Priest, a member of the
lineage of neo-Meinongians. Priest [35] holds what appear to be a primary and a sec-
ondary view about the existential load that the existential quantifier—what he calls the
‘particular’ quantifier—expressions carry with them. The primary view is that ‘there
exists’ is an existentially loaded expression, but ‘some’ is not. The secondary view is
basically an acceptance that ‘there is’ means the same thing (or carries the same load)
as ‘there exists’. I call this a ‘secondary’ view because he does not seem terribly commit-
ted to it, but he definitely leans toward it. His main point, though, is that at least one
existential quantifier expression (‘some’) is not existentially loaded, which is a challenge
to the received Quinian view. Priest gives both of his views in the following passage:
Meinongians of various kinds, including noneists such as myself, hold that
one can quantify over something without taking it to exist. More specifically,
what is most naturally called the particular quantifier (being the dual of the
universal quantifier) should not be read as ‘there exists’—or even ‘there is’,
there being no real difference between being and existence; it should simply
be read as some, leaving it open whether the some in question exists or
not.10
9 Another non-Meinongian ambiguity appears in Timothy Williamson’s [48], where he proposes
a distinction between a ‘logical’ and a ‘commonsensical’ reading of the existential quantifier, in order
to handle a puzzle about necessary existents. I don’t have the space to discuss this view further here,
but it may be one more interesting view (among others that I’m sure I’m unaware of) to add in to the
ambiguity mix.
10 Priest [35], p. 42
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Here he clearly states both the primary and secondary views I mentioned above. The
language of existential ‘loading’ does not come here, but he does use it elsewhere.11
He thinks that ‘some’ is a legitimate existential quantifier expression, but it does not
commit us to the existence of what we quantify over. What makes the secondary view
secondary is something he says here:
Distinguishing between ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ invites the view that there
is a second-class notion of existence, ‘subsistence’—a view that has caused
much confusion and so is best avoided. Honestly, there is no difference
between existence and being. For all that, it is possible, of course, to use
‘there is’ simply to mean ‘some’ if one wants.12
This claim, especially the last sentence, makes it clear that he does hold the view that
being and existence are the same, but he’s not all that interested in arguing for it, and
he doesn’t seem to think it would make much difference if we went the other way on
this point.13
Priest’s discussion is focused on Quine, since his “On What There Is” was so hugely
influential as the root of the orthodox view. In discussing Quine, Priest says the follow-
ing:
Quine argues that the use of names and predicates is not existentially com-
mitting, but there is absolutely no argument given as to why quantification
is existentially committing. Quine simply assumes that the domain of quan-
tification comprises existent objects—or what comes to the same thing, that
the particular quantifier is to be read as ‘there is’. No argument is given for
this: it is stated simply as a matter of dogma. [. . . ] At any rate, if Russell
used bad arguments for the view, Quine uses none at all.14
11 Priest [35], p. 42
12 Priest [35], p. 43, n. 6
13 Though there are different consistent ways one could hold a view like Priest’s, he takes ‘there exists’
to involve an existence predicate. In the formal language, we could represent this with the particular
quantifier (he uses a ‘S’ symbol) quantifying into the existence predicate, or we could just abbreviate
this as ‘∃’ if we want to continue to use that as a symbol of an existentially loaded quantifier. See
Priest [34] section 1.4, for a discussion of this issue.
14 Priest [35], p. 52
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Priest is wrong to say there is no argument at all in “On What There Is” for this view
of Quine’s, though not tragically wrong. I discussed Quine’s argument (about ratios) in
the previous chapter, including why I found it lacking as an argument for the orthodox
view. Now, Priest doesn’t claim that Quine never gives an argument for this view.
He doesn’t discuss any others, but he does say that he’s, “not suggesting that there
are no other arguments for taking the particular quantifier to be existentially loaded,
possibly even in Quine’s later corpus.”15 This could be a reference to the argument in
Quine [39] that I also discussed in the previous chapter. But, since Priest’s aim here was
mostly historical, he focused only on “On What There Is” because it was so influential
of an essay. Priest sees this essay as having solidified the view that the quantifier is
existentially loaded, and he’s further pointing out the problem of this view having been
solidified by a paper with no (good) argument for the view.
Overall, I’m friendly to Priest’s approach, though I do think he misses the mark in
drawing the distinction between ‘some’ on the one hand and ‘there is’/‘there exists’ on
the other. He does not give a substantial argument for this particular split, and I think
the reasons he does provide should push him (like me) to seeing ‘there exists’ on one
side and ‘there is’/‘some’ on the other. I have not discussed ‘some’ explicitly in this
dissertation, since space requires me to stay quite narrowly focused on this topic, but I
offer (without argument) that I maintain ‘some’ to mean essentially the same thing as
‘there is’, context-sensitive in the same way.
Also, since Priest’s view is mostly given without semantic details, I don’t have cause
to agree with or criticize it on that level. He does appear to be motivated by his
ontology in making this distinction, though, so reading his work as a non-Meinongian,
one does not exactly have a strong reason to agree with him. It appears as if he takes
the quantifier referred to by ‘some’ to be the normal existential quantifier we study in
logic, with the existential loading coming in as either an ‘existence’ predicate or as a
restriction of the domain of the quantifier. Either way, these are methods available only
to the Meinongian who allow, in some way or another, for there to be objects that to
not exist.
15 Priest [35], p. 53
105
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, my goal has been primarily to tie up a few loose ends that seemed
worthy of discussion, but not until now. Both the issue of epistemic contextualism and
that of other anti-orthodox views would have been a bit of a distraction in the previous
chapters, but they should enrich the discussion here at the end, adding a bit to the
arguments from the previous chapters.
To sum up the entire project, my primary goal has been to present and argue for
an anti-orthodox view of meaning of the existential quantifier expressions ‘there is’ and
‘there exists’. In Chapter 1, I presented the notion of ‘ontological robustness’ in order to
motivate my view, discussing how ‘there exists’ claims appear to always be ontologically
robust, while ‘there is’ claims appear to be sometimes ontologically robust, sometimes
not. In Chapter 2, I presented the details of my contextualist view of ‘there is’, including
also some discussion of why I take ‘there exists’ to be invariant. In Chapter 3, I extended
the discussion of domains and nonexistent objects to fill out my view and address some
potential objections. In Chapter 4, I discussed the details of the orthodox view and
presented my holistic argument against it, tying together the pieces from the previous
chapters and adding some new points in favor of my view. And here in Chapter 5, I’ve
added a discussion of epistemic contextualism and two other anti-orthodox views about
existential quantifier expressions.
References
[1] Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, editors. Themes from Kaplan.
Oxford University Press, New York, 1989.
[2] J. L. Austin. Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962.
[3] Jody Azzouni. Talking About Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations, and Fictions.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.
[4] Jon Barwise and Robin Cooper. Generalized quantifiers and natural language.
Linguistics and Philosophy, 4:159–219, 1981.
[5] George S. Boolos, John P. Burgess, and Richard C. Jeffrey. Computability and
Logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 5th edition, 2007.
[6] David Braun. Empty names. Nouˆs, 27:449–69, 1993.
[7] David Braun. Empty names, fictional names, mythical names. Nouˆs, 39:596–631,
2005.
[8] David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, editors. Metametaphysics.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.
[9] Stewart Cohen. Knowledge and context. Journal of Philosophy, 83:574–83, 1986.
[10] Stewart Cohen. Knowledge, context, and social standards. Synthese, 73:3–26, 1987.
[11] Stewart Cohen. How to be a fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives, 2:91–123, 1988.
[12] Stewart Cohen. Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons. Philo-
sophical Perspectives, 13:57–89, 1999.
106
107
[13] Stewart Cohen. Contextualism defended some more. In Matthias Steup and Ernest
Sosa, editors, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, pages 67–71. Blackwell, Ox-
ford, 2005.
[14] Stewart Cohen. Knowledge, speaker and subject. The Philosophical Quarterly,
55:199–212, 2005.
[15] Max Cresswell. Formal semantics. In Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley, edi-
tors, The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, pages 131–46. Blackwell,
Oxford, 2006.
[16] Keith DeRose. The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context,
Vol. 1. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.
[17] John Hawthorne. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.
[18] Eli Hirsch. Ontology and alternative languages. In Chalmers et al. [8], pages
231–59.
[19] Thomas Hofweber. Quantification and non-existent objects. In Anthony Everett
and Thomas Hofweber, editors, Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-
Existence, pages 249–73. CSLI Press, Stanford, 2000.
[20] Thomas Hofweber. A puzzle about ontology. Nouˆs, 39:256–83, 2005.
[21] Thomas Hofweber. Innocent statements and their metaphysically loaded counter-
parts. Philosopher’s Imprint, 7:1–33, 2007.
[22] David Kaplan. Afterthoughts. In Almog et al. [1].
[23] David Kaplan. Demonstratives. In Almog et al. [1].
[24] David Kaplan. The meaning of ouch and oops: Explorations in the theory of
Meaning as Use. UC Berkeley Graduate Council Lectures, 2004.
[25] Edward L. Keenan. Natural language, sortal reducibility and generalized quanti-
fiers. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 58:314–325, 1993.
108
[26] Edward L. Keenan. The semantics of determiners. In Shalom Lappin, editor,
The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory, pages 41–63. Blackwell, Oxford,
1996.
[27] Edward L. Keenan and Jonathan Stavi. A semantic characterization of natural
language determiners. Linguistics and Philosophy, 9:253–326, 1986.
[28] Jeffrey C. King. Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account. MIT Press,
2001.
[29] David Lewis. New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philos-
ophy, 61:343–77, 1983.
[30] David Lewis. Noneism or allism. Mind, 99:23–31, 1990.
[31] David Lewis. Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74:549–67,
1996.
[32] David Lewis. How many lives has schro¨dinger’s cat. In Frank Jackson and Graham
Priest, editors, Lewisian Themes, pages 4–23. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2004.
[33] Stephen Nelson. Fictional worlds: An anti-realist view of fictional characters. un-
published manuscript, 2011.
[34] Graham Priest. Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.
[35] Graham Priest. The closing of the mind: How the particular quantifier became
existentially loaded behind our backs. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 1, 2008.
[36] W. V. O. Quine. On what there is. Review of Metaphysics, 2:21–38, 1948.
[37] W. V. O. Quine. Two dogmas of empiricism. Philosophical Review, 60:20–43, 1951.
[38] W. V. O. Quine. Word and Object. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1960.
[39] W. V. O. Quine. Existence and quantification. L’Age de la Science, 1:151–164,
1968.
109
[40] Agust´ın Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano, editors. Absolute Generality. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 2007.
[41] Nathan Salmon. Nonexistence. Nouˆs, 32:277–319, 1998.
[42] Theodore Sider. Four-Dimensionalism. Clarendon, Oxford, 2001.
[43] Theodore Sider. Ontological realism. In Chalmers et al. [8], pages 384–423.
[44] Jason Stanley and Zoltan Gendler Szabo´. On quantifier domain restriction. Mind
and Language, 15:219–61, 2000.
[45] Peter van Inwagen. Why i don’t understand substitutional quantification. Philo-
sophical Studies, 39:281–85, 1981.
[46] Peter van Inwagen. Material Beings. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1990.
[47] Peter van Inwagen. Meta-ontology. Erkenntnis, 48:233–50, 1998.
[48] Timothy Williamson. Necessary existents. In A. O’Hear, editor, Logic, Thought
and Language, pages 233–51. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.
